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ARE YOU TRYING TO IMPLY SOMETHING?:
UNDERSTANDING THE VARIOUS STATE APPROACHES TO
IMPLIED COVENANTS OF CONTINUOUS OPERATION IN
COMMERCIAL LEASES
Jerald Clifford McKinney, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is being written during tough economic times. In Sep-
tember and October 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped
a couple thousand points. When economic times are this dire, compa-
nies may begin to rethink strategies and may look at store closings as a
way to save money. For instance, Circuit City considered closing at
least 150 stores in an unsuccessful effort to avoid bankruptcy.' Many
other retailers have either done the same or considered it. The same
thing, however, can happen when the economy is good. Businesses
may decide to abandon an existing store and relocate to a better loca-
tion to follow shoppers or community trends. Businesses may also
decide to leave a site that is simply unprofitable for whatever reason.
In many of these cases, the relocating or closing business may be
in a long-term lease for its current building. The business could decide
to close-up shop and keep paying rent for the remainder of the term.'
Alternatively, the business may try to find a sublessee or assignee to
take over the space. Whichever option is chosen, however, businesses
need to carefully consider the potential legal consequences. Many
commercial leases address this situation by expressly requiring the
tenant to remain open for business known as a "covenant of conti-
nuous operation."3 Alternatively, the lease may expressly permit the
* Mr. McKinney practices real estate law at the Little Rock firm of Quattle-
baum, Grooms, Tull & Burrow PLLC. He earned a Bachelor of Arts from Baylor
University, a Master of Public Administration from the University of Arkansas, a
Juris Doctor from the University of Arkansas and a Master of Laws from Southern
Methodist University. Mr. McKinney is licensed to practice in Arkansas, Mississippi
and Texas. Mr. McKinney is currently serving his third term as Chair of the Real
Estate Law Section of the Arkansas Bar Association, and he is an editor and founder
of the Arkansas Real Estate Review. Mr. McKinney also serves as an Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Law at the UALR William H. Bowen School of Law where he teaches Real
Estate Finance and Real Estate Transactions Skills.
1. Shopping Centers Today Week, International Council of Shopping Centers,
Vol. 13, No. 42 (October 27,2008).
2. Of course, bankruptcy could change the analysis discussed in this article.
3. Covenants of continuous operation are sometimes referred to in the industry
as "covenants against going dark." See generally Austin Hood, Continuous Operation
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tenant to cease operations at will so long as the tenant continues to
pay rent through the end of the lease.4
Some commercial leases, however, do not address this situation.
What happens then? Many states recognize an implied covenant of
continuous operation that could force a tenant to keep its doors open
even though there is no requirement to do so written in the four cor-
ners of the lease.' Arkansas has very limited case law on this issue;
there is, however, a federal district court case addressing the concept
of an implied covenant of continuous operation.6 This article will first
discuss implied covenants generally, including the "Standard Factors"
that many jurisdictions apply. 7 Next, the article will explore the
sparse Arkansas case law currently available.8 This article will also
examine how courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the issue.9
Finally, this article will make suggestions for approaches to implied
covenants of continuous operation that could be utilized in Arkansas.' °
II. IMPLIED COVENANTS IN GENERAL
As noted in the introduction, Arkansas has very little case law on
implied covenants of continuous operation. There is some case law on
implied covenants in general, and the law is decidedly against finding
implied covenants." According to the Arkansas Supreme Court:
An implied covenant is one that may be reasonably inferred from
the whole agreement and the circumstances attending its execu-
tion. They are not favored by the law and can be justified only
Clauses and Going Dark, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 365, 367 (2001).
4. See id. at 370.
5. See, e.g., EMRO Mktg. Co. v. Plemmons, 855 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1988); Evans v.
Grand Union Co., 759 F. Supp. 818 (M.D. Ga. 1990); First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Casa D'Angelo, Inc. v. A & R
Realty Co., 553 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
6. See William L. Patton Jr., Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop. Group,
Inc., 370 F. Supp.2d 846 (E.D. Ark. 2005); infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See generally William L. Patton, Jr. Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop.
Group, Inc., 370 F. Supp.2d 846, 848 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Blake v. Scott, 92 Ark. 46, 46,
121 S.W. 1054, 1055 (1909); State v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595, 602, 1844 WL 443,
at *5 (1844).
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upon the ground of legal necessity arising from the terms of the
contract and the circumstances attending its execution. 2
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that it is the "duty of the
Court to construe a contract according to its unambiguous language
without enlarging or extending its terms."' 3 Nevertheless, Arkansas
courts will find implied covenants when necessary." Arkansas case
law, however, does not provide a clear protocol for determining when
to imply a covenant, but other states do. For example, California, and
many other states, have adopted a general protocol that can be ap-
plied to evaluate a variety of implied contractual covenants known as
the "Standard Factors" that provide the following:
The rules which govern implied covenants have been summarized
as follows: "(1) The implication must arise from the language used
or it must be indispensible to effectuate the intention of the parties;
(2) it must appear from the language used that it was so clearly
within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unne-
cessary to express it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on
the grounds of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only
where it can be rightfully assumed that it would have been made if
attention had been called to it; (5) there can be no implied cove-
nant where the subject is completely covered by the contract.' 15
12. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Ware, 269 Ark. 313, 320-21,602 S.W.2d 620, 623 (1980).
13. North v. Philliber, 269 Ark. 403, 406, 602 S.W.2d 643, 645 (1980). See also
Koppers Co. v. Mo. Pac. RR. Co., Inc., 34 Ark. App. 273, 277, 809 S.W.2d 830, 832
(1991) (stating, "[i]f there is no ambiguity in the language of a contract, then there is
no need to resort to rules of construction. And 'the first rule of interpretation is to
give to the language employed by the parties to a contract the meaning they in-
tended."' (internal citations omitted)).
14. See generally SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 341 Ark. 673, 695, 22 S.W.3d 157, 170
(2000); Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Prod. Co., 320 Ark. 298, 305, 896 S.W.2d
867, 871-72 (1995) (noting that there are five types of implied covenants in oil and gas
leases and holding that the evidence supported determination that gas producer
breached implied duty not to compromise or amend the contract with utility).
15. Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 779 (Cal. 1955).
See also First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, 940 (Ariz.
App. 1986); Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n of Del., 101 A.2d 308, 313-14 (Del.
Ch. 1953); Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478, 481 (Ga. 1991) (Bell and
Benham, JJ., dissenting) (dissent encouraged the state to adopt these standards); Con-
servative Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Warnecke, 324 S.W.2d, 471, 479 (Mo. App.,
1959); Downtown Ass'n, Ltd. v. Burrows Bros. Co., 518 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ohio App.
1986); Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Brown v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 617 P.2d 704, 710-11 (Wash. 1980); Oliver v. Flow Int'l Corp.,
155 P.3d 140, 143 (Wash. App. 2006).
2009] 429
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Arkansas has not expressly adopted the Standard Factors. These
factors are similar to the language in Amoco Production Co. v. Ware6,
where the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "an implied covenant
is one that may be reasonably inferred from the whole agreement and
the circumstances attending its execution."' 7 This statement seems to
at least embody the spirit of the five Standard Factors. Therefore, it is
instructive to briefly consider the meaning of each of the five Standard
Factors because it is conceivable that Arkansas will either adopt these
factors or some close variation of them if Arkansas decides to adopt a
factor test to analyze implied covenant cases.
A. The Implication Must Arise From the Language Used or It Must
Be Indispensible to Effectuate the Intentions of the Parties
This factor allows an implied term to enter a contract when the
implication arises from the language used or when the term is indis-
pensible to effectuate the intentions of the parties. For instance, in
Galier v. Feder Pontiac, Inc.," the parties entered into a lease agree-
ment which required the tenant to "comply with the 'requirements of
all public authorities."" 9 The tenant allegedly failed to adequately
maintain the premises.' The landlord sued the tenant for various
claims including breach of an implied warranty to maintain the prop-
erty." The court, however, found that the lease did not include an
express warranty to maintain the property.2 Nevertheless, the court
determined that the express covenant in the lease to meet the "re-
quirements of public authorities" necessarily implied a covenant to
maintain the property because maintenance would be necessary to
meet applicable city ordinances.23
16. 269 Ark. 313,602 S.W.2d 620 (1980).
17. Id. at 320-21, 602 S.W.2d at 623.
18. No. 56233, 1989 WL 142397 (Ohio App. Nov. 22, 1989).
19. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted).
20. Id. at *2-3.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *4.
23. See Galier v. Feder Pontiac, Inc., 1989 WL 142397 at *4 (Ohio App. Nov. 22,
1989).
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B. It Must Appear From the Language Used That It Was So Clearly
Within the Contemplation of the Parties that They Deemed It
Unnecessary to Express It
This factor allows a term to be implied when it appears from the
language used that the omitted term was so clearly within the contem-
plation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it.
For instance, in Tiegs v. Boise Cascade Corp.,24 Mr. Don Watts leased
a farm to Mr. Frank Tiegs. z The lease expressly stated that, "[lt was
'contingent on [Mr. Watts] finding adequate water for [the] property,'
and provided the irrigation for the acreage would apply 7.5 gallons per
minute. 26 Mr. Watts provided the water, but Mr. Tiegs alleged that
the well water was contaminated by a paper mill's wastewater and was
consequently unusable for irrigation. 2 The court concluded that there
was an implied covenant that the water would not be contaminated so
that it could be used for irrigation.'
C. Implied Covenants Can Only Be Justified on the Grounds of Le-
gal Necessity
Sometimes a covenant must be implied to supply a necessary
element of consideration without which there would not be a valid
contract. 9 In Oliver v. Flow International Corp.,3 Michael Oliver tried
to argue for an implied covenant to make reasonable efforts to patent,
manufacture, and market a robot that was designed to clean the inside
of industrial liquid storage tanks." Mr. Oliver, the robot's inventor,
signed an agreement with Flow International Corporation ("Flow").32
Flow agreed to pay Mr. Oliver $150,000 upon completion of the proto-
type with additional payments and royalties upon the future sale of
robots.33 Flow paid the $150,000 but made minimal efforts to market
24. 922 P.2d 115 (1996).
25. Id. at 117.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 118.
28. Id. at 124.
29. See, e.g., Oliver v. Flow Int'l Corp., 155 P.3d 140, 143 (Wash. App. 2006).
30. 155 P.3d 140, 143 (Wash. App. 2006).
31. Id. at 142.
32. Id.
33. Id.
2009]
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the robot."4 Mr. Oliver argued that the future payments implied a duty
to patent, manufacture and market the robot.35
The court disagreed with Mr. Oliver because the court believed
the $150,000 initial payment was adequate consideration for the
agreement. The court contrasted the situation with the case of Wood
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.3 6 In Wood, Lady Duff-Gordon gave a
fashion marketer the exclusive right to use her name on dress labels.37
The Wood court found an implied covenant to use best efforts to mar-
ket the dresses because it was the only way that she could get any
money.3 If Lady Duff-Gordon could not be paid, the contract would
be unsupported by consideration. Such was not the case in Oliver, as
the plaintiff had already received a large upfront sum.
D. A Promise Can Be Implied Only Where It Can Be Rightfully As-
sumed That It Would Have Been Made If Attention Had Been
Called to It
This factor requires that a term can be implied only if the court
believes that the implied covenant would have been expressly made if
attention had been called to it at the time the contract was negotiated.
In other words, before a covenant can be implied, there must be no
doubt that the parties would have agreed to the term during negotia-
tions if they had thought about it. For instance, in City of Glendale v.
Superior Court,39 the City of Glendale entered into a twenty-year writ-
ten lease to Giovanetto Enterprises, Inc. for Giovanetto to operate a
restaurant in city-owned property.' Five years later, the City con-
demned the lease to demolish the building for construction of a public
project. 1 Giovanetto sued for breach of contract damages instead of
relying on the condemnation award.42 Giovanetto argued that the
twenty-year lease constituted an implied term that the City would not
exercise its eminent domain power to terminate the lease early, espe-
cially when the parties knew at the time the lease was executed that
Giovanetto would have to expend considerable funds to improve the
34. Id.
35. See Oliver v. Flow Int'l Corp., 155 P.3d 140, 142 (Wash. App. 2006).
36. Id. at 143 (citing to Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15
(1917)).
37. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214.
38. Id. at 214-15.
39. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305 (1993).
40. Id. at 308.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 309.
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leased space.43 The court, however, concluded that the City could not
have abridged by contract its sovereign authority to take property by
eminent domain and that the City likely would not have been willing
to make such a promise when it entered into the lease." Therefore, the
court concluded that there was no implied agreement not to exercise
eminent domain because the conditions might not have been agreed to
had the parties contemplated the situation at the time the lease was
signed.45
E. There Can Be No Implied Covenant Where the Subject Is Com-
pletely Covered by the Contract
This factor prohibits finding an implied covenant when the sub-
ject is completely covered by the contract. For instance, in Lowe v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. ,' Mr. Karl Lowe's predeces-
sor in interest signed a loan application with the Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Company (the "Insurance Company") to borrow
$4,700,000 for a real estate development project.' The application re-
quired a total of $94,000 be paid to the Insurance Company as a depo-
sit that would become liquidated damages if the loan did not close.48 In
exchange for the $94,000, the Insurance Company became irrevocably
committed to extend the $4,700,000 loan as long as the borrower satis-
fied certain conditions.49 Mr. Lowe did not satisfy the required condi-
tions, and the Insurance Company retained the $94,000 as liquidated
damages. ° Mr. Lowe tried to classify the liquidated damages as puni-
tive to seek a return of the money.' In order to trigger a specific Cali-
fornia statute that would have made the liquidated damages punitive,
Mr. Lowe tried to argue that there was an implied covenant that Mr.
Lowe was bound to take out a loan from the Insurance Company."
The court dismissed this claim because the required conditions were
43. Id. at 311.
44. See City of Glendale v. Super. Ct., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 311 (1993).
45. Id.
46. 127 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1976).
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Lowe v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1976).
52. Id. at 29.
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completely covered by the contract by the parties. 3 Thus, the court
could not find an implied covenant."
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF CONTINUOUS OPERATION
This article has considered implied covenants in general, includ-
ing Arkansas' general approach. The question is how, specifically, will
Arkansas courts approach an implied covenant of continuous opera-
tion when a case eventually presents itself? So far, there is only one
case in Arkansas on point, but it is a federal case interpreting Arkan-
sas law, so it is merely persuasive.
In this section, this article will look at the aforementioned federal
case and look at how other states have addressed the same issue. Do
other states simply apply the Standard Factors or do they use special
factor tests to examine implied covenants of continuous operation?
Are there commonly used factor tests? Should Arkansas have a spe-
cial approach to this issue? Does the federal case from Arkansas ade-
quately address the issue as an Arkansas state court would (or
should)?
To start, it is useful to consider exactly what an implied covenant
of continuous operation is and what it does. An implied covenant of
continuous operation, which is also known as a covenant against going
dark, arises when a landlord alleges that the tenant has a duty to oper-
ate a business within the leased premises at all times during the term
of the lease.5 The opposite of a covenant of continuous operation is
the right of a tenant to cease business operations (i.e., let the store go
dark) as long as the tenant continues to pay rent and fulfill its other
express obligations, such as maintaining the building. A tenant may
have a variety of reasons for abandoning a leased building while still
paying the rent, including shutting down an unprofitable store or relo-
56cating to a better location.
Conversely, a landlord may have many reasons why it wants a te-
nant to maintain an operating business and is not satisfied with just
receiving rent. There are three principal reasons, however, why a lan-
dlord would want a continuous operation obligation: (1) the tenant's
rental obligations include percentage rent (i.e., the amount of rent is
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., William L. Patton, Jr. Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop.
Group, Inc., 370 F. Supp.2d 846, 848 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
56. See Forrest Drive Assoc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 576, 584
(M.D.N.C. 1999).
434 [Vol. 31
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tied to the store's gross sales-if there are no sales, there is no percen-
tage rent); 7 (2) the landlord has co-tenancy obligations with other te-
nants in the shopping center (i.e., the landlord has either made prom-
ises to other tenants that certain anchor tenants58 will be in the shop-
ping center or that a certain percentage of the shopping center will be
occupied by open and operating businesses); 9 and (3) the general ap-
pearance and safety of the shopping center may be adversely impacted
by an empty business (i.e., an unoccupied building makes the shopping
center look unsuccessful and could become a place for criminals or
vagrants to congregate).'
Ideally, the parties should address this issue in the lease agree-
ment, but this does not always happen. Also, even if the issue is ad-
dressed, a party may allege that the language is somehow deficient,
ambiguous or does not adequately address the situation. When there
is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opportunity arises for a lawsuit.
A. The Patton Case
The only Arkansas case to address implied covenants of conti-
nuous operation is an Eastern District Court case, William L. Patton
Jr. Family Ltd. Partnership, LLLP v. Simon Property Group, Inc.
("Patton").61 The Patton case involved a dispute between the owners
of University Mall (Patton) in Little Rock, Arkansas and the ground
lessee/operator of the mall (Simon Property Group).62
1. Background
University Mall was one of the first enclosed malls in Arkansas.
On October 1, 1965, Patton and Simon's predecessor in interest signed
a ground lease to allow Simon's predecessor to build a shopping mall
on Patton's property.63 The lease had a term through December 31,
2026. ' Over the years, University Mall fell into disrepair."' The mall
57. See, e.g., Papa Gino's, Inc. v. Assembly Square Mall, LLC, No. 9804879, 1998
WL 1181159, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1998).
58. An anchor tenant is a major business that attracts customers to a shopping
center.
59. See, e.g., Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Tex. Co., 383 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964).
60. See, e.g.,Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.
61. 370 F. Supp. 2d 846 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
62. Id. at 847.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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lost one of its main anchors when Montgomery Ward, a large retail
chain, went bankrupt.66 Then another anchor, M.M. Cohn, shut down a
significant portion of its operations before eventually being bought
out and subsequently entering bankruptcy.67 The third main anchor,
J.C. Penney, decided to leave the mall and relocate to a new shopping
center.8 The mall had many vacancies and serious maintenance prob-
lems, including allegations by Patton that the mall was infested with
mold and had problems, such as when a large segment of roof that
blew off the building into a busy street one night.69
Patton sued Simon for breach of its express obligation to main-
tain the mall in "good and tenantable repair. ' '70 Patton also claimed
that Simon breached an implied obligation under the lease agreement
to locate and maintain viable retail tenants at University Mall so that
percentage rental income would be generated. Simon responded to
the suit by asserting that Arkansas does not recognize the implied co-
venant of continuous operation.72
2. The Court Defining the Factors
To analyze the implied covenant claim, the Patton court started
by looking at Arkansas' law on implied covenants and observed that
Arkansas law states:
The construction and legal effect of a written lease contract are to
be determined by the court as a question of law, except where the
meaning of the language depends on disputed extrinsic evidence...
When contracting parties express their intention in a written in-
strument in clear and unambiguous language, it is the court's duty
65. See Edward Klump, University Mall Landowners, Leaseholder in Discussions
over Future of Premier Site, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 13, 2004, at 1G & 2G;
Leroy Donald & Laura Stevens, University Mall Was First of Its Kind in State, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, N.w. ARK. ED., Sept. 16, 2007; University Mall Empties as Re-
tailers Wait for Summit, ARK. Bus., Jan. 28,2002.
66. Donald & Stevens, supra note 66.
67. Donald & Stevens, supra note 66.
68. Donald & Stevens, supra note 66.
69. See Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Any Further
Continuance, William L. Patton Jr. Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP et al. v. Simon Prop.
Group, Inc. et al., No. 4:04-CV-1477GH (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8,2006).
70. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court analyzed the plaintiff's claim as an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation. Id
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to construe the writing in accordance with the plain meaning of the
language employed.73
The court pointed out that, as a general rule, implied covenants
are not favored in Arkansas law.7' Specifically, the court said the fol-
lowing with regards to Arkansas law on implied covenants:
This view [that implied covenants are not favored by Arkansas law]
owes its force to the presumption that when the parties have en-
tered into a written agreement that embodies their obligations,
they have expressed all of the conditions by which they intend to
be bound. Courts are reluctant to imply covenants where the obli-
gations sought to be imposed on the contracting parties are not ex-
pressed in the written text.75
The court also determined that Arkansas law holds:
The courts will declare implied covenants to exist only where there
is a satisfactory basis in the express contract for the parties which
makes it necessary to imply certain duties and obligations in order
to effect the purposes of the parties to the contract made.76
The court acknowledged, however, that courts in other states
have recognized an implied covenant of continuous operation under
circumstances similar to those present in the Patton case.77 The court
determined that Patton's claim that Simon breached an implied obli-
gation under the lease agreement to locate and maintain viable retail
tenants at University Mall equated to an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation.7 ' The court also recognized that there are numerous
tests for determining when to imply a covenant of continuous opera-
tion.79 The court specifically noted six factors from a Kentucky case'
and two more from an Oklahoma case:"
(1) whether base rent is below market value;
73. Id. at 848 (quoting Holytrent Props., Inc. v. Valley Park Ltd. P'ship, 71 Ark.
App. 336, 339, 32 S.W.3d 27, 29 (2000)).
74. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
75. Id. (quoting Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 530 (Ok-
la. 1985)).
76. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D, Covenants, Condi-
tions, and Restrictions §29 (2004)).
77. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 849.
80. Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401, 405 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
81. Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985).
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(2) whether percentage payments are substantial in relation to base
rent;
(3) whether the term of the lease is lengthy;
(4) whether the tenant may sublet;
(5) whether the tenant has rights to fixtures;
(6) whether the lease contains a noncompetitive provision;8
(7) the obligation must arise from the presumed intention of the
parties as gathered from the language used in the written instru-
ment itself or must appear from the contract as a whole that the
obligation is indispensable in order to give effect to the intent of
the parties; and
(8) it must have been so clearly within the contemplation of the
parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it.83
The court also noted a Utah decision that found "the existence of
a ground lease rather than a lease of an already constructed commer-
cial building is detrimental to the claim that the lease implies a cove-
nant of continuous operation."'8 The Patton court did not list this as
one of the enumerated factors; however, based on the court's analysis,
this probably should have been listed as a factor as well. The court
stated that "the law has clearly established that a tenant has signifi-
cantly more flexibility and control over the premises under a ground
lease than it has under a building lease."" The court observed that a
82. For the first six factors, see Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (quoting Lagrew,
905 F. Supp. at 405 (E.D. Ky. 1995)). It is worth noting, as discussed in greater detail
later in this article, that the Lagrew case is not favorable to tenants. See infra Part
IV.M. In Lagrew, the Kentucky court interpreted the factors in a manner to find a
covenant of continuous operation. The holding in Lagrew, however, is not consistent
with the rest of the Patton decision. The court's decision to cite these factors from the
Lagrew case is somewhat perplexing. An Arkansas court's analysis might change if it
used the rationale from Lagrew and not just the factors cited in the case.
83. For the last two factors, see Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (citing Mercury Inv.
Co., 706 P.2d at 530-31). The court separated the list into two parts: the Kentucky
factors and the Oklahoma factors. The lists are combined in this article for conveni-
ence.
84. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (citing Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.,
104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004)). Interestingly, the Patton court cited both Utah's Oak-
wood Village decision and Kentucky's Lagrew decision. As discussed in more detail
later in this article, these two decisions are at strong odds, and Oakwood Village con-
tains a strong rebuke of Lagrew.
85. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 850.
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ground lease bears a close relationship to a fee purchase of real prop-
erty and conveys the functional equivalent of fee simple ownership.
The court interpreted this to mean that the landlord has a higher bur-
den to prove that a term should be implied (i.e., the covenant of conti-
nuous operation).8 The court even went so far as to say, "Even assum-
ing that the implied covenant of continuous operation was applicable
to a ground lease, the Court could not find it applicable here." This
dictum seems to imply that it might be impossible to find an implied
covenant of continuous operation in a ground lease. If this dictum is
followed by Arkansas state courts, then it would eliminate a signifi-
cant number of leases from the analysis without having to consider
other factors.
Perhaps even more interesting than the dicta regarding a ground
lease, the court stated, "The presence of an 'any lawful use' provision
in the lease also precludes the finding of an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation." 89 The court did not elaborate on this statement oth-
er than to cite a Georgia case as standing for the same proposition.
This is very strong language if interpreted as an absolute bar on find-
ing an implied covenant of continuous operation when there is an
"any lawful use" clause in a lease, which is a common term. If this dic-
tum is followed by Arkansas courts, then the remainder of the analysis
is unnecessary when this clause is present.
The court noted that, among the enumerated factors, "the ade-
quacy of rent has been the most influential" factor.91 The "adequacy of
rent," however, is not one of the six listed factors, at least not in so
many words. 2 Presumably, the court was referring to the first and
second factors (whether the base rent (i.e., fixed rent) is below market
value and whether percentage payments are substantial in relation to
base rent) since these are the only two factors that deal directly with
the rent. Therefore, presumably, the court believes the first two fac-
tors are due the most weight in the analysis. This view seems to be
supported by the court's statement:
86. Id. at 850-51.
87. Id. at 851.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 852 (citing Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478 (Ga.
1991)).
91. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (quoting Joel R. Hall, Operations Covenant,
ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, 36TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ALI-ABA,
MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 2143 (July 28-31, 2004).
92. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401, 405 (E.D. Ky. 1995);
supra Part III.A.2.
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Recognized as a corollary to the general rule governing covenants
that could be inferred from a written instrument is the principle
that when the rental reserved in a lease is based upon a percentage
of the gross receipts of a business and a guaranteed substantial
minimum rent, a covenant would not be implied; but if the mini-
mum rental is so low as to be nominal, or where there is no mini-
mum rental, then a covenant might be implied. 93
In addition to analysis focused on the rent provisions, the Patton
court pointed out that "[tihe court [in Woolworth] noted that there
was nothing contained in the lease by which Woolworth promised to
operate its business in such a way as to increase gross receipts or to
'accelerate customer traffic flow for the benefit of other tenants."' '4
The court also cited with favor the Oklahoma court's finding in
Woolworth that:
The lease is cast in the form of a highly sophisticated document
employing clear, precise and unambiguous language that covers a
myriad of details regarding the parties' relationship as landlord vis-
a-vis tenant. In the face of comprehensive terms, this court is po-
werless to add a covenant requiring Woolworth to generate sales
that would subject it to liability for percentage rental.The parties
could have inserted an explicit termination clause to be triggered
by continued failure of Woolworth to reach some agreed level of
gross receipts within a specified period. To now imply the covenant
pressed for by Mercury would be to rewrite the parties' agree-
ment.We should be loath to hold Woolworth to any greater level of
business productivity than Mercury itself was able to exact from a
willing tenant. 95
3. The Court's Analysis of the Factors
Even though the court listed a number of factors, the court only
partially analyzed some of them.' The court did not address the fac-
tors of whether the tenant has rights to fixtures and whether the lease
contains a noncompetitive provision.9' Although the court noted that
the lease was lengthy and that Simon had the right to sublet, the court
93. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (citing Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 706 P.2d 523,531 (Ok. 1985)).
94. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 849-50 (quoting Mercury, 706 P.2d at 531).
95. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 850.
96. See Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d 846.
97. See id.
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did not analyze these factors.98 The court blended the analysis for the
remaining factors. The following is a discussion of the court's analysis
of the factors that it did discuss.
a. Whether base rent is below market value and whether
percentage payments are substantial in relation to base
rent
As mentioned above, the court seemed to blend these two factors
in its analysis. Simon had an obligation to pay both fixed rent -a cer-
tain amount of rent that was not dependent on the revenue of the
shopping center-and percentage rent-a portion of Simon's revenue
from operating the shopping center.1° As the mall operator, Simon's
revenue depended on leasing the mall to subtenants who would pay
rent to Simon, who in turn would pay a portion of the subtenant's rent
to Patton as percentage rent. 'O Even though the lease did not contain
an express obligation for Simon to lease the mall to subtenants, Patton
alleged that Simon had an implied duty to do so to generate percen-
tage rent.'° Patton also relied on several references in the lease and
subsequent amendments to paying mortgage obligations with rent re-
ceived from subtenants.'O The court noted, however, that the fixed
rent was substantial at $210,000 per year, which precluded a finding of
an implied covenant of continuous operation."0
The court also dismissed Patton's attempt to analogize Simon's
obligations to that of an oil and gas lessee who has an implied cove-
nant under Arkansas law to diligently explore and develop the miner-
als." The court stated that an oil and gas lessors "sole compensation"
is from the royalties received from the oil and gas development. ' Be-
cause the oil and gas lessor has no other source of revenue from the
lease, the court noted that the implied covenant is necessary for the
98. Id.
99. Fixed rent is also sometimes referred to as "base rent," "minimum rent" or
"guaranteed rent." The Patton court used the base rent terminology. Patton, 370 F.
Supp. 2d at 847. The term "fixed rent" is more often used in the industry, so this ar-
ticle uses that term instead.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 847-48.
104. Id. at 852.
105. William L. Patton Jr., Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
106. Id.
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lease to make economic sense, but the same is not true in a situation
where the tenant is paying $210,000 per year in fixed rent.'9 The court,
however, did not address the fact that many oil and gas leases contain
upfront bonus rental payments that can be very substantial."° A bonus
payment is an upfront payment to the lessor upon signing the lease
before any exploration takes place. These upfront payments arguably
conflict with the court's analysis, which relied on a case from 1911.1 9
The court's analysis might have been different had it considered that
bonus payments are often part of modem oil and gas leases because
the lessor's sole compensation is not solely from the royalties that de-
pend on the exploration or development of the minerals.
b. The obligation must arise from the presumed intention
of the parties as gathered from the language used in the
written instrument itself or it must appear from the con-
tract as a whole that the obligation is indispensable in
order to give effect to the intent of the parties and it
must have been so clearly within the contemplation of
the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it
Like the previous factors, the court blended the two Oklahoma
factors into essentially one analysis. The court noted that the lease was
negotiated by sophisticated parties and was a detailed document."'
The court found it particularly persuasive that the parties amended
the lease on six separate occasions and the amendments addressed
fixed and percentage rent."1 The court felt the parties had more than
ample opportunity to include a covenant of continuous operation if
desired. As the court stated:
[i]f the parties had wanted to include a duty on defendants to lo-
cate and maintain suitable retail tenants, they had ample opportu-
nity to include such language in the amendments. "Faced with the
clear language of the document negotiated by the parties them-
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Rothwell v. Steven L. Yeager, LLC, No. CA07-1004, 2008 WL
1961480, at *1 (Ark. App. May 7, 2008) (noting an $11,175 bonus payment for a 111.75
acre tract); Lindquist v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n, No. CA99-1306, 2000 WL 696414, at
*1 (Ark. App. May 31, 2000) (noting a $100 per acre bonus payment); Ark. Oil & Gas,
Inc. v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 281 Ark. 207,208,662 S.W.2d 824,825 (Ark. 1984).
109. Id. at 852 (relying on Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W.
837 (1911)).
110. Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
111. Id.
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selves, this Court will not imply a covenant which would restrict
one party's freedom to conduct its own business as it sees fit. The
parties were capable of including such a provision in the express
language of the contract and failed to do so. To imply such a cove-
nant would amount to rewriting the parties' agreement; an act this
Court will not perform.'
12
The court also observed that language in one of the amendments
seemed to indicate that an implied covenant would be inconsistent
with the parties' intentions."' The Fourth Amendment, which ad-
dressed fixed rent and percentage rent, stated:
It is understood and agreed by Lessors and Lessee that upon their
execution of this Fourth Amendment, the first Letter Agreement,
Second Letter Agreement and 1980 Amendment shall be of no fur-
ther force or effect and the entire agreement of the parties shall
consist of those written terms, covenants and conditions contained
in the agreement, the April, 1968 Amendment, the June, 1968
Amendment, and this Fourth Amendment.1 14
The court interpreted this language from the Fourth Amendment
as the parties agreeing that there were no implied covenants in the
agreement."' Based on this, the court felt that it could not imply a co-
venant of continuous operation.
Even though the court enumerated eight factors for determining
whether to imply a covenant of continuous operation, it really did not
discuss or use the factors in a traditional point-by-point analysis. The
Patton court primarily relied on the following factors: (i) the compre-
hensiveness of the written lease; (ii) the sophistication of the parties;
(iii) the adequacy of the fixed rent; and (iv) the permitted uses of the
leased property. Other states, however, approach this issue differently.
The following segment of this article will address the way that other
states have approached the same issue. Because the Patton decision is
not binding on Arkansas state courts, it is possible that Arkansas may
adopt some of the analysis utilized by other states or reject some of
the Patton court's analysis.
112. Id. (quoting Keystone Square Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.,
459 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. App. 1984)).
113. See Patton, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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IV. THE APPROACH OF OTHER STATES
The doctrine of the implied covenant of continuous operation is
not very well developed outside of a few states. Some states may not
have any case law addressing the situation. 6 Therefore, it is useful to
examine some demonstrative cases from states that have case law on
the issue to see the types of tests courts apply."7
A. Alabama
Alabama does not have a case that uses the term "implied cove-
nant of continuous operation," but it does have a case that deals with a
very similar issue. In Percoff v. Solomon,"' the parties signed a lease
with a percentage rent clause."9 The tenant opened another business
near the leased premises where he competed with his own business,
which caused a reduction in the percentage rent collected by the lan-
dlord.1" In considering whether the tenant had an implied obligation
116. I ran a search for cases on Westlaw on November 7,2008. The Boolean search
terms were as follows: "implied covenant of continuous operation" or "implied cove-
nant of continued operation" or "covenant against going dark" or "implied covenant
to operate." Based on this search, the following states did not return any relevant
results, although the states with an asterisk (*) have relevant case law found using
different terminology: Alabama*, Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia*, Colora-
do, Florida*, Hawaii, Idaho*, Kansas*, Louisiana* (Louisiana had one case using
these search terms, but it was applying Mississippi law), Maine, Maryland, Michigan*
(Michigan has a case that falls within the search terms, but the case addressed an im-
plied covenant to explore for minerals under a mineral rights lease), Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Jersey*, New Mexico, New York*, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island*, South Carolina*, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington*
and Wyoming*. The following states had relevant cases (in some instances, like Ar-
kansas, the relevant case was federal): Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
117. Some of the omitted states may have cases on the issue. I did not undertake
exhaustive attempts to find every possible alternate search term for an "implied cove-
nant of continuous operation," so some of these excluded states may have relevant
case law. I believe, however, the included cases sufficiently present the various ap-
proaches used throughout the country. The excluded states are Alaska, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont and Virginia. I also excluded Arkansas
from this list since it is the primary subject of this article.
118. 67 So.2d 31 (Ala. 1953).
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id. at 35.
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not to impair the percentage rent obligation, the Alabama Supreme
Court stated that:
[a]n implied covenant must rest entirely on the presumed intention
of the parties as gathered from the terms as actually expressed in
the written instrument itself, and it must appear that it was so
clearly within the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it
unnecessary to express it, and therefore omitted to do so; or it must
appear that it is necessary to infer such a covenant in order to ef-
fectuate the full purpose of the contract as a whole gathered from
the written instrument. It is not enough to say that an implied co-
venant is necessary in order to make the contract fair, or that with-
out such a covenant it would be improvident or unwise, or that the
contract would operate unjustly. It must arise from the presumed
intention of the parties as gathered from the instrument as a
whole. 121
In analyzing the situation, the Alabama Supreme Court did not
believe that the existence of percentage rent made it necessary to find
an implied covenant." The court analogized the situation to an earlier
decision where the court determined "that a covenant not to engage in
competing business is not implied from a sale of the 'good will' of a
business.""n
The court also stated that "[n]o case has come to our attention
which holds as a matter of law that under a percentage lease with a
guaranteed substantial minimum rental, covenants are to be implied of
the kind which appellee seeks to have implied in the lease under con-
sideration. ' '12' This last sentence indicates the possibility that Alabama
might find an implied covenant of continuous operation when the
lease contains no fixed rent or an insignificant amount of fixed rent.
B. Arizona
When analyzing implied covenants of continuous operation, Ari-
zona uses the Standard Factors used generally for implied covenants
discussed earlier in this article, which read as follows:
(1) the implication must arise from the language used ...; (2) it must
appear from the language used that it was so clearly within the con-
templation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to ex-
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 41.
123. Id.
124. Percoff, 67 So. 2d at 39.
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press it; (3) implied covenants can only be justified on the grounds
of legal necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where it can be
rightfully assumed that it would have been made if attention had
been called to it; (5) there can be no implied covenant where the
subject is completely covered by the contract.125
In addition to the Standard Factors, Arizona applies one addi-
tional test when an implied covenant of continuous operation is al-
leged. The court stated that, "[i]n agreements where the rental is
based either upon a straight percentage of sales, or upon a minimum
fixed rental and additional rental based upon a percentage of sales, the
inadequacy of the base rent implies a covenant of continuous opera-
tion.
' '1
6
In Arizona, a provision allowing assignment or subletting does
not affect the determination of whether there is an implied covenant
of continuous operation. The court was clear that "[t]he presence of a
right to assign or sublet is not necessarily inconsistent with an implied
covenant of continuous operation. The two covenants can be harmo-
nized to permit subletting or assignment to a business of the same cha-
racter. ,1
27
C. California
California uses essentially the same test as Arizona. In addition to
the Standard Factors, California compares the fixed rent and percen-
tage rent.' 8 An implied covenant of continuous operation will only be
found when the lease relies on percentage rent without fixed rent or
with only minimal fixed rent that is not substantial.'29 California courts
have also found the existence of noncompetition clauses limiting a
landlord's ability to lease property to competitors of a tenant to be a
factor that may weigh in favor of finding an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation.3 °
125. First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, 940 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (citing Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Ctr. Corp., 647 P.2d 643, 646
(Ariz. Ct. App.1982)).
126. First Am. Bank, 729 P.2d at 940 (citing Walgreen, 647 P.2d at 646).
127. First Am. Bank, 729 P.2d at 941 (quoting with approval from the finding of
the trial court).
128. See Brentwood Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-16387, 2000 WL
734384, at *1 (9th Cir. June 7, 2000). See also Brentwood Investors v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. C-95-0856, 1998 WL 337968, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998).
129. See Brentwood Investors, 2000 WL 734384, at *1.
130. See College Block v. Atl. Richfield Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 179, 183 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
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D. Connecticut
Connecticut follows a six-part test to determine when to imply a
covenant of continuous operation, citing Kentucky's Lagrew decision
that the Patton case cited, but did not actually analyze. The factors are
as follows:
(1) whether base rent is below market value, (2) whether percen-
tage payments are substantial in relation to base rent, (3) whether
the term of the lease is lengthy, (4) whether the tenant may sublet,
(5) whether the tenant has rights to fixtures, and (6) whether the
lease contains a noncompetitive provision."'
In applying this test, Connecticut begins with an examination of
the fixed rent.32 The court in Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle33
stated that "[tihe reason for the applicability of this factor in relation
to the implied covenant is that the amount of minimum rent can be
tested by a trier to determine its adequacy."'' 3 In Pequot, there was no
fixed rent, so it was easy for the court to conclude that this factor
weighed in favor of implying the covenant."
The second factor is whether the percentage rent is substantial in
relation to the fixed rent.36 In Pequot, the total lack of fixed rent clear-
ly made the percentage rent substantial in relation to the fixed rent.37
The third factor is whether the term of the lease is lengthy.1 38 In
Pequot, the lease had a twenty-five year term. 139 The court felt that
this length was indicative of intent by the parties that the tenant re-
mains in business the entire time."1 ° The court said that
Pequot [the tenant] would not have entered into a lease with such a
length and Brunelle [the landlord] would not have accepted rental
131. William L. Patton Jr., Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 2d 846, 849 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (quoting Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc.,
905 F. Supp. 401, 405 (E.D. Ky. 1995)). See also Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle,
698 A.2d 920, 923-24 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (quoting Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc.,
905 F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995)).
132. See Pequot, 698 A.2d at 924.
133. 698 A.2d 920 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
134. Id. at 924.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 924.
137. Id.
138. See id..
139. Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 924 (Conn. App. Ct.
1997).
140. Id.
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payments based solely on Pequot's sales if both parties had not in-
tended that Pequot remain in business for the full length of the
lease. 41
The fourth factor is the tenant's ability to sublet (which presuma-
bly also includes the tenant's right to assign).142 In Pequot, the lease
gave the tenant a limited right to sublease, which the tenant argued
was indicative of the intent that the parties did not contemplate a co-
venant of continuous operation.143 The court, however, disagreed and
found that the fact that the landlord retained the right to refuse a sub-
lease implied that only a suitable replacement would occupy the
leased premises, thus indicating an intent that the premises continue
to be occupied.' 44
The fifth factor is whether the tenant has the right to remove fix-
tures from the leased premises.' Even though the tenant in Pequot
had rights to the fixtures, the court did not believe that this fact alone
was fatal to finding an implied covenant of continuous operation."
4
The court agreed that this factor weighed against implying the cove-
nant, but the court held that it did not outweigh the other factors in
the overall analysis.
The sixth factor is whether the landlord is subject to a noncompe-
titive provision.'" In Pequot, the court determined that the nature of
the lease made a noncompetitive provision unnecessary, so the factor
did not seem to make a significant difference to the analysis.'49
E. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia has limited case law on the subject of
implied covenants of continuous operation. The District of Columbia
may imply a covenant of continuous operation when the lease contains
a percentage rent clause.5  Although there does not appear to be a
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 924 (Conn. App. Ct.
1997).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 925.
149. Id.
150. See Cong. Amusement Corp. v. Weltman, 55 A.2d 95, 96 (D.C. 1947) (stating
that "[tihe situation would also be different if the rent were based on a percentage of
lessees' sales, for then the lessor would have a contractual right not to have his rent
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formula recognized in the District of Columbia to analyze alleged im-
plied covenants of continuous operation, the District of Columbia is
clear that merely including a restriction on the use of the premises will
not create an implied covenant of continuous operation.'
The District of Columbia addressed this situation in a case where
a tenant leased a building and agreed "[t]hat he [the tenant] will use
said premises for the sale of alcoholic beverages and other items
usually associated with the sale of liquor for 'Off Sale' consumption
and for no other purpose whatsoever."'52 The District of Columbia
held that "[t]he law does not say that by accepting the grant of pre-
mises for a particular purpose, with a prohibition against its use for
any other purpose, a lessee becomes affirmatively obligated to use it
continually for such purpose."'53
F. Florida
Florida may imply a covenant of continuous operation when "re-
quired to vitalize the full intent of the parties to the lease.""'5 Florida
does not have a formal set of factors for analyzing implied covenants
of continuous operation.'5 Florida, however, examines the use restric-
tions, the sufficiency of the fixed rent, the tenant's promises related to
the percentage rent and the tenant's right to remove fixtures.'56
The use restrictions are one of the most important factors in Flor-
ida.' In Florida,
[t]he general rule seems to be that in the absence of a specific pro-
vision therefor, the lessee is under no obligation to occupy or use
the leased premises for the purposes for which they are adapted
and that a covenant granting the privilege to use the premises for a
particular purpose or prohibiting its use for other purposes does
not necessarily involve an obligation on the part of the tenant to
use it for that purpose.""
diminished by an arbitrary shutdown of lessees' business.").
151. Id.
152. Id. at 95.
153. Id, at 96.
154. Jerrico, Inc. v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 400 So.2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (citing Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, 7 So.2d 342 (Fla.
1942)).
155. See Jerrico, 400 So.2d 1316.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 1317 (citing Floste Corp. v. Marlemes, 53 So.2d 538 (Fla.1951)).
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If, however, the lease includes specific provisions about how the
tenant is supposed to operate its business, such as stating that the te-
nant will operate a restaurant and specifying the hours of operation,
then the general rule can be overcome.9
Florida courts may imply a covenant of continuous operation
when the percentage rent composes a significant amount of the rent
received by the landlord 6° In Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer
Properties,16 1 the court found the percentage rent significant because
the total rent was "substantially reduced" as a result of the lost per-
centage rent when the tenant ceased operations.
Florida also looks at any promises the tenant made concerning
the percentage rent. In Mayfair, the court found an implied covenant
of continuous operation because the tenant was required to "use its
best efforts to obtain and maintain the highest volume of business on
the premises."' In Diltz v. J & M Corp.,'64 the court did not find an
implied covenant of continuous operation precisely because the lease
lacked the type of language found in Mayfair Operating Corp.6 Simi-
larly, in Stemmler, the court did not find the covenant because the
lease lacked language similar to that found in Mayfair."6
Florida may also find the right of the tenant to remove fixtures
from the premises weighs against finding a covenant of continuous
operation.67 The Stemmler court held that
[t]he right 'at any time' to remove 'all' fixtures, counters, shelving,
show cases, etc., from the leased premises is entirely inconsistent
with the idea that there is an implied agreement to continue to op-
erate a jewelry business, to which such items are essential, in the
leased premises.' 68
Moreover, Florida also has an interesting case that discusses a te-
nant trying to impose an implied covenant on the landlord to have the
rest of the shopping center built and to continuously operate it to sup-
159. See Jerrico, 400 So.2d at 1318.
160. See Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, 7 So.2d 342, 343 (Fla.
1942).
161. 7 So.2d 342, 343 (Fla. 1942).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 381 So.2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
165. Id. at 273.
166. Stemmler v. Moon Jewelry Co., 139 So.2d 150, 152-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962) (quoting Ridgefield Investors v. Mae Ellen, Inc., 57 So.2d 842, 844 (Fla.1952)).
167. See Stemmler, 139 So.2d at 152.
168. Id.
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port the tenant's business. 69 In that case, the court rejected the te-
nant's argument because the lease was sufficiently detailed and there
was opportunity to have included such a clause if it had been truly
important to the tenant.
170
G. Georgia
Georgia follows a three-part test when determining whether a
lease contains an implied covenant of continuous operation. 7' The
factors are as follows:
(1) whether the lease provides the tenant can use the premises in
any other lawful manner; (2) whether the lease is freely assignable;
and (3) whether the lease contains a provision that the tenant pays
a percentage of revenue as rent.172
Georgia examines the permitted uses under the lease.' 73 Specifi-
cally, if the lease allows the premises to be used for any lawful pur-
pose, then the court is unlikely to find an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation. 17' Georgia's rationale is that "the language of the
agreement expressly negates a requirement of continuous opera-
tion."'75
Georgia also examines the discrepancy between the amount of
fixed rent and percentage rent. In Georgia,
[als a general rule, courts will not infer a covenant of continuous
operation where the lease provides for the payment of both a per-
centage of gross receipts and a "substantial minimum" rent.
76
Georgia looks at the ratio of percentage rent as compared to
fixed rent to determine if the fixed rent is "substantial" instead of
whether the dollar amount appears to be large. For instance, in
169. See S. H. Kress & Co. v. Dresse & Garfield, Inc., 193 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
170. Id. at 195.
171. See DPLM, Ltd. v. J.H. Harvey Co., 526 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1999).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 1991).
175. Id. at 479.
176. DPLM, 526 S.E.2d at 415 (citing Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 216 S.E.2d 341,
344 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)).
177. See DPLM, 526 S.E.2d at 415; Cf. William L. Patton Jr., Family Ltd. P'ship,
LLLP v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 370 F. Supp.2d 846,852 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
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DPLM, Ltd. v. J.H. Harvey Co."8 the Georgia Court of Appeals found
that the fixed rent was substantial when the fixed rent constituted be-
tween 50% to 54% of the total rental during the life of the lease. 9 The
DPLM court also noted another case where the fixed rent constituted
47% of the total rent and that court deemed it substantial.",
Georgia also places substantial weight on whether the lease is
freely assignable. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that:
[an] agreement's provision for free assignability by the tenant,
without consent of the lessor, weighs strongly against a construc-
tion of the contract which would require the tenant to continue its
181business throughout the term of the lease.
Further, Georgia does not find the presence of a noncompetitive
restriction on the landlord persuasive." In Kroger Co. v. Bonny
Corp.,183 the tenant had the exclusive right to place a grocery store in
the mall.M The court, however, did not find this noncompetitive re-
striction as weighing in favor of an implied covenant of continuous
operation."
H. Idaho
Idaho examines several factors when determining whether to
imply a covenant of continuous operation, but it does not appear to
have a formal list of factors.' Idaho considers the following factors:
(i) whether the landlord constructed a building for the tenant's use
(this could be interpreted as looking at the amount spent by the lan-
dlord on the tenant's behalf, such as a tenant buildout allowance); (ii)
whether the lease has percentage rent; (iii) whether the fixed rent is
178. 526 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
179. Id. at 415.
180. Id. The DPLM court cited Piggly Wiggly Southern Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d
478 (Ga. 1991) at pages 479-80 for this proposition but noted that this case does not
state the rent percentage, but the court stated that it knew the percentage in that case
from the time that it was at the Court of Appeals before being appealed to the Geor-
gia Supreme Court.
181. Piggly Wiggly, 405 S.E.2d at 479-80 (citing Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 216
S.E.2d 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
182. See Kroger, 216 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 343.
185. Id.
186. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (super-
ceded on other grounds by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120, as recognized in Her-
rick v. Leuzinger, 900 P.2d 201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)).
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substantial compared to the percentage rent; and (iv) whether the
lease imposes a noncompetition covenant on the landlord to protect
the tenant from competitors."7 In Idaho, an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation cannot be found if the lease allows the tenant to sub-
lease the premises and remove its fixtures from the premises.'
Idaho will consider the presence of a merger clause 89 A merger
clause, also called an integration clause, is a term in a contract that
states that the contract constitutes and contains the entire agreement
between the parties.'O In Idaho, however, the merger clause must
clearly exclude implied covenants to effectively inoculate the lease
from a finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.' 9' In Bas-
tian, the court found a merger clause insufficient that "merely pro-
vides that the contract governing the rights of the parties . . . 'shall
merge into this instrument and this lease agreement shall govern as
the sole agreement between the parties .... ""9
Idaho will also consider the intensity of the negotiations concern-
ing the lease.9 Idaho, however, does not believe that the intensity of
the negotiations will preclude finding an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation.'94
I. Illinois
Illinois uses several factors when evaluating implied covenants of
continuous operation, although there does not appear to be a specific
list, at least not in a recent case. 95
Where a lease specifies a particular use of the property and rent is
to be computed on a percentage of profit basis, there is an implied
covenant to occupy and use the premises for the specified purpose
187. Id. at 1082.
188. See Bastian, 643 P.2d at 1082.
189. See id. at 1081-82.
190. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 824 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an integration clause
as "[a] contractual provision stating that the contract represents the parties' complete
and final agreement and supersedes all informal understandings and oral agreements
relating to the subject matter of the contract").
191. See Bastian, 643 P.2d at 1081-82.
192. Id. at 1082 (citation omitted).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See Stein v. Spainhour, 521 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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and in a manner which will generate the amount of rent contem-
plated by the parties.' 96
Illinois also holds that allowing the tenant to sublet or assign the
lease prohibits finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.1 97
Furthermore, allowing the tenant to use the premises "for any other
lawful purpose" can be fatal to finding an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation.' g8
J. Indiana
Like Illinois, Indiana seems to lack a standard list of factors for
analyzing implied covenants of continuous operation."9 Indiana, how-
ever, looks at several factors.2 ° First, Indiana courts note that implied
covenants in general are disfavored.21 Indiana considers the relative
bargaining power of the parties, the sophistication of the parties, and
the sophistication and comprehensiveness of the lease. °2 Indiana also
seems to adopt the position that having a general assignment or sub-
letting right prohibits finding an implied covenant of continuous oper-
ation.2 °3
K. Iowa
Iowa looks at several factors when determining whether to imply
a covenant of continuous operation but, like many states, does not
appear to have a formal list.2' The factors considered in Iowa include
the following: (i) whether the fixed rent is substantial in comparison to
the percentage rent; (ii) whether the landlord built the building for the
tenant (i.e., whether the landlord expended funds upfront for the te-
nant's benefit); (iii) whether the lease imposes a noncompetition co-
196. Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. See Keystone Square Shopping Ctr. Co., v Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 459
N.E.2d 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
200. See id.
201. See id. at 423.
202. See id. Cf Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
(holding that the intensity of the negotiations concerning the lease is irrelevant to
finding an implied covenant).
203. See Keystone, 459 N.E.2d at 423.
204. See E. Broadway Corp. v. Taco Bell Corp., 542 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1996);
Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa
1978).
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venant on the landlord to protect the tenant from competitors;205 and
(iv) whether there is an economic interdependence between the lan-
dlord and the tenant.26 A general right of assignment will negate find-
ing an implied covenant of continuous operation, but a restricted right
of assignment or subletting that requires the landlord's consent will
not prohibit the implied covenant.7" Also, the existence of a merger
clause is fatal to finding an implied covenant of continuous opera-
tion.20 8
L. Kansas
Kansas has an interesting case that is similar to an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation. °9 In Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,21°
the tenant attempted to abandon the premises and sublease it to a
shoe store.211 The landlord alleged that there was an implied covenant
restricting assignment by the tenant to purposes which would yield a
percentage rental comparable to that paid by the tenant.212 Kansas did
not announce a factor test for examining these situations. 3 The court,
however, did not imply a restriction requiring the tenant to operate a
214business.
In this case, the main concern of the Kansas Supreme Court was
whether the existence of a percentage rent clause compelled the te-
nant to maintain the percentage rent at a certain level. The court
stated:
[i]f this court determines an implied covenant in the lease existed
which required payment of comparable rentals [following an as-
signment] we say, in effect, it was intended as a fixed rental requir-
ing comparable sales. This effect would be to change the percen-
tage of income rental into a fixed rental based on past sales expe-
215
rience.
205. Broadway, 542 N.W.2d at 820.
206. Fashion Fabrics, 266 N.W.2d at 29.
207. See Broadway, 542 N.W.2d at 820.
208. See Fashion Fabrics, 266 N.W.2d at 28. See also Broadway, 542 N.W.2d at
819.
209. See Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 424 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1967).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 543.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 548.
214. Id.
215. Williams, 424 P.2d at 549.
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The Kansas Supreme Court also found that the existence of a
provision allowing full rights to assign and sublet the premises de-
stroyed the landlord's argument. 16 Further, the court found it persua-
sive that the existence of fixed rent designed to compensate the lan-
dlord for its investment in the property after acquiring the property in
217a sale-leaseback transaction with the tenant.
M. Kentucky
Kentucky has one of the leading cases on implied covenants of
continuous operation.218 Although not always followed, the Lagrew219
case has been discussed in numerous other decisions including: Indi-
ana's Rothe case, Utah's Oakwood Village case, Oklahoma's Oklaho-
ma Plaza case, Tennessee's BVT case, Arkansas' Patton case and
Connecticut's Pequot case.
220
Kentucky begins with the following basic proposition:
The courts will declare implied covenants to exist only when there
is a satisfactory basis in the express contract of the parties which
makes it necessary to imply certain duties and obligations in order
to effect the purposes of the parties to the contract made. Such co-
venants can be justified only upon ground of legal necessity arising
from the terms of the contract or the substance thereof. The impli-
cation from the words must be such as will clearly authorize the in-
ference or an imputation in law of the creation of a covenant. It is
not enough to say that it is necessary to make the contract fair, that
it ought to have contained a stipulation which is not found in it, or
that without such covenant it would be improvident, unwise, or op-
erate unjustly. The covenants raised by law from the use of particu-
lar words in an instrument are only intended to be operative when
the parties themselves have omitted to insert the covenants. But
when a party clearly indicated to what extent he intends to warrant
216. Id.
217. Id. at 551.
218. Rothe v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 21 Wis. 256 (1866).
219. Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
220. In relative order, see Rothe v. Revco D.S., Inc., 976 F. Supp 784 (S.D. Ind.
1997); Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004); Okla. Plaza
Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1998); BVT Lebanon
Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001);
William L. Patton Jr., Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 370 F.
Supp.2d 846 (E.D. Ark. 2005); and Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920
(Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
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or obligate himself, that is the limit of his covenant, and the law
will not hold him beyond it.... 22
Kentucky originated and uses the same six factors as listed above
under the Connecticut heading. The Kentucky court recognized that
"shopping centers are designed for going concerns, not empty store
fronts."' 2 The court even went so far to say:
[t]hus, when an entity in the business of operating a retail drug
store negotiates a lease with a shopping center absent a showing of
unusual circumstances, it is implicit that the lessor [sic-should
read "lessee"] intends to operate a store and that the lessor is leas-
ing the space for that purpose.223
Considering the hesitancy to find implied covenants of continuous
operation found in many other states, this statement is somewhat radi-
cal. It essentially switches the burden from the landlord proving that
there should be an implied covenant of continuous operation to the
tenant to prove what "unusual circumstances" should prohibit such a
finding.'
The Kentucky court also has a different approach to the suffi-
ciency of fixed rent in Lagrew. The court recognized that fixed rent
alone does not provide the landlord a hedge against inflation. 6 Based
on this, the Kentucky court determined that merely having substantial
base rent is insignificant if the lease has a long term and the landlord's
only protection from inflation is the percentage rent.227
Like Arizona, Kentucky does not believe that the tenant having
the right to assign or sublet is fatal to finding an implied covenant of
continuous operation.' Essentially, Kentucky holds that this right is
not fatal because an assignment to a similar business entity should
generate percentage rent similar to what the landlord is accustomed to
receiving. m
221. Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. at 405 (citation omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 405-06.
224. Cf Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 200 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Mass. 1964); Plaza As-
socs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725,729 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
225. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. 401.
226. Id. at 406. I suppose this would be different if the lease periodically adjusted
the fixed rent for inflation, which is often the case.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 407.
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Kentucky also considers which party has the right to retain the
fixtures at the end of the lease."3 If the landlord is entitled to the fix-
tures, then that is strong evidence that the parties intended the tenant
to continuously operate the premises. 3' The reverse, however, is not
true and does not prohibit finding an implied covenant of continuous
operation. 32
The Lagrew court also addressed a clause in the lease that said
"[n]o obligation not stated herein shall be imposed by either party
hereto. ' '1 3 The court held that this merger clause was insufficient to
disclaim an implied covenant of continuous operation 34 The court
stated:
The defendant must recognize, when dealing with "implied" cove-
nants, such provision will never be written into an agreement and a
failure to specify a provision is not necessarily "evidence that there
was no such understanding." The courts look to the terms and cir-
cumstances of the parties [sic] agreement to see if the law must
necessarily imply a provision to effectuate the true intent of the
agreement. Under such circumstances, an oblique reference to the
situation, like Paragraph 27 [the merger clause], is not always given
full force and effect. For example, in every contract, there is an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to impose on the par-
ties "a duty to do everything necessary to carry out" the intent of
the contract. Likewise, when a contract contains a clause disclaim-
ing implied warranties, the law requires the clause be "conspi-
cuous" so as to draw the readers [sic] attention to the clause. Such
exclusionary language disclaiming implied warranties in a contract
will not always be upheld by the Court.2 5
This language highlights a possible distinction between the Ken-
tucky situation and that found in other states. Kentucky imposes a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in leases. 6 Although this is a
common approach,237 not all states recognize a cause of action for
230. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. 401.
231. See id. at 407.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citations omitted).
236. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. at 407. See also Iroquois Manor v. Walgreen Co.,
No. 3:99CV-27-S, 2000 WL 33975410, at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 12,2000); Ranier v. Mount
Sterling Nat'l Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Ky. 1991).
237. See, e.g., Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So. 2d 876, 883 (Miss. 2005); Wallace v. Nat'l
Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn.1996) (alphabetical by state).
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breach of this covenant.23 For instance, Arkansas specifically does not
recognize a tort for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing except in the context of insurance cases; even though Arkansas
recognizes that every contract imposes an obligation to act in good
faith.239 Arkansas has not decided whether a cause of action for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing can arise from a con-
tract.2'4
N. Louisiana
Not too surprisingly, the analysis in Louisiana is somewhat differ-
ent. In Slidell Investment Co. v. City Products Corp. ,21 the tenant
leased a one story building for a term of approximately ten years with
the fixed rent being $6,412 per year and the percentage rent being four
percent of gross sales in excess of $142,500.242 The lease contained a
provision allowing the premises to be used "for the sale, storage Or
[sic] display of goods, wares and merchandise."243 The lease also con-
tained a noncompetition clause restricting the landlord's right to lease
nearby property to competitors of the tenant.2
The tenant raised several arguments to avoid finding an implied
covenant of continuous operation but cited cases from common law
jurisdictions to support its position, which the Louisiana court rejected
as inconsistent with Louisiana's civil law system.245 The Louisiana
court found an implied covenant of continuous operation despite the
language in the lease that theoretically allowed the tenant to use the
premises for non-retail purposes (i.e., the storage of goods) because
the court, relying on other Louisiana decisions, found "that it was the
intention that plaintiff [the landlord] be paid a basic and percentage
rental on the premises. It is the opinion of this court that the record
amply shows that this lease agreement would not have been entered
into had plaintiff not anticipated receipt of percentage rental."246
238. See, e.g., Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 730-31 (noting the argument that the
covenant of good faith does not apply to landlord tenant law but not ruling on the
issue).
239. See Preston v. Stoops, No. 07-805, 2008 WL 2287217, at *1 (Ark. June 5,
2008).
240. See id.
241. 202 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
242. Id. at 324.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 325.
245. Id. at 327.
246. Slidell Inv. Co., 202 So. 2d at 325.
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0. Massachusetts
The leading case in Massachusetts has a somewhat different fact
pattern than the typical scenario found in other states. In Stop & Shop,
Inc. v. Ganem"7 the tenant leased a building for a term of approx-
imately thirteen years with fixed rent of $22,000 per year and percen-
tage rent of 1.25% of gross sales above $1,269,230, but only if the te-
nant's total sales at this location and another location in the City of
Lawrence exceeded $3,000,000 per year." The tenant planned to close
the store because it was apparently not profitable. 9 The landlord filed
a claim against the tenant because the tenant had opened two other
stores near the leased premises, one store about a mile and a half away
and the other store about one mile away, which pulled business from
the original store."0
In analyzing the case, the Massachusetts court stated that,
even if there is a more than nominal minimum rent [i.e., fixed rent],
other circumstances such as that the fixed rent is significantly be-
low the fair rental value of the property might justify the conclu-
sion that the parties intended that the lessor have the benefit of the
percentage rent throughout the term.5'
The court held that the landlord had the burden of proving a disparity
between the fixed rent and the fair rental value that was sufficient
grounds for implying a covenant to operate.f2
Ultimately, the Stop & Shop court did not analyze a list of factors,
but it felt that the landlord did not meet its burden of proving the ne-
cessity of implying a covenant of continuous operation.f3 The court
concluded that the mere presence of a percentage rent clause does not
give rise to an implied covenant of continuous operation unless there
are some other facts justifying such a finding.' For instance, the court
stated that "[w]e assume, without deciding, that such interest [a lan-
dlord's interest in receiving percentage rent] could be protected
247. 200 N.E.2d 248 (Mass. 1964).
248. Id. at 250.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id at 251.
252. Id. at 252.
253. Stop and Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 200 N.E.2d 248, 252-53 (Mass. 1964).
254. Id. at 253.
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against certain acts of the lessee, as for example, discontinuance of
operations for spite or to inflict harm. '' 5
P. Michigan
Michigan's analysis makes it rather difficult to imply a covenant
of continuous operation. Michigan courts start with the axiom that
leases are construed against the landlord unless drafted by the te-
nant.l 6 Even when drafted by the tenant, however, courts still construe
even express restrictive covenants strictly and in favor of the free alie-
nability of land.f7 Michigan's position is that,
[g]enerally ... the lessee is under no obligation, in the absence of a
specific provision therefor, to occupy or use, or continue to use, the
leased premises, even though one of the parties, or both, expected
or intended that they would be used for the particular purpose to
which they seemed to be adapted or which they seemed to be con-
structed! 58
This general presumption against implied covenants of conti-
nuous operation can be overcome, however, when the lease provides
for percentage rent." When the lease has a percentage rent clause,
Michigan will consider a variety of factors.2' First, Michigan considers
whether the fixed rent provides a substantial return on the landlord's
investment.26 "In the absence of evidence that the minimum rent is
unsubstantial, courts generally do not infer a covenant to continue
operations.,22
Second, the Michigan court holds that having a thoroughly nego-
tiated lease weighs against finding an implied covenant.23 The court
stated that "where the parties have deliberately and extensively nego-
tiated a contract, as a Court we should decline to rewrite an agree-
ment to include a continuous occupancy clause."2 '
255. Id.
256. See Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
257. See id. at 607.
258. Id. (internal citations omitted).
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 609.
262. Schuberg, 317 N.W.2d at 609 (citation omitted).
263. See id. at 610.
264. Id.
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Third, the court holds that the presence of express continuous
operating clauses in other leases executed by the landlord weighs
against finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.2 65 The
Schuberg court noted;
[p]laintiff [the landlord] negotiated several contracts during the pe-
riod with other tenants in the shopping center. Some of those con-
tracts specifically included continuous occupancy clauses. Under
these circumstances, we find the parties' intent did not encompass
Kroger's [the tenant] being bound by a continuous occupancy
clause.266
Michigan does not believe the presence of a noncompetition co-
venant on the landlord weighs in favor of finding an implied covenant
of continuous operation." This position conflicts with the approach of
Kentucky's Lagrew decision and the cases in other states that follow
Lagrew.26
Q. Minnesota
Minnesota considers several factors to determine if there should
be an implied covenant of continuous operation and follows Michigan
in many respects.269 The Minnesota court considers the following fac-
tors: (i) whether the fixed rent is substantial and a smaller part of the
total rent than the percentage rent; (ii) whether the parties were so-
phisticated and actively negotiated the lease; (iii) whether the landlord
included an express covenant of continuous operation in leases with
third-parties; (iv) whether the lease gives the tenant broad assignment
or sublease rights; and (v) whether the lease has language detailing the
scope of the business operation or the identity of the operator. 270
First, the Minnesota court examines whether the fixed rent is sub-
stantial and a smaller part of the total rent than the percentage rent.271
Minnesota holds that "the implication of an operating covenant is less
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Ky. 1995). See also
Okla. Plaza Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1998); Rothe
v. Revco D.S., Inc., 976 F. Supp 784 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albert-
sons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004).
269. See Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
270. Id. at 729-30.
271. See id.
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likely where the tenant is paying 'substantial' base rent [i.e., fixed rent]
and a relatively smaller part of the rent as a percentage of gross re-
ceipts. 2 72 In Plaza Associates, the court found the fixed rent substan-
tial when the fixed rent was $6,666 per month and the percentage rent
ranged from 0% percent to 46% during the life of the lease.2 73 The
court held that fixed rent is "substantial" if there is a correlation be-
tween the base rent and the fair market value of the lease at the time
of the execution, which makes an implied covenant less likely."
Second, Minnesota considers whether the parties were sophisti-
cated and actively negotiated the lease.27 The Plaza Associates court
held that the "active and extensive negotiation of a lease by sophisti-
cated parties also weights against finding an implied covenant in a
lease 'since the parties were free to include whatever provisions they
wished.'76
Third, Minnesota considers whether the landlord included an ex-
27press covenant of continuous operation in leases with third-parties.
The Plaza Associates court further held that the "failure of a landlord
to use an express operating covenant where it has included the cove-
nant in the lease of other tenants further weights against finding an
implied operating covenant because it makes clear that the landlord
know how to employ such a clause. 2
71
Fourth, Minnesota considers whether the lease gives the tenant
broad assignment or sublease rights.r9 With this factor, the Plaza As-
sociates court held that "provisions in a lease giving a tenant broad
assignment or sublease rights is another factor preventing the implica-
tion of an operating covenant. The express right of a tenant to assign
or sublet and vacate the premises is inconsistent with an implied obli-
gation to remain and do business. "m
Fifth, Minnesota considers whether the lease has language detail-
ing the scope of the business operation or the identity of the opera-
tor."' Here, the court held that "an operating covenant is less likely to
be implied where, as here, there is no language detailing the scope of
272. Id. at 729.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 727.
276. Id. at 729 (internal citations omitted).
277. See id. at 727.
278. Id. at 729-30.
279. See id. at 727.
280. Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 730.
281. See id. at 727.
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the business operation or the identity of the operator. '" In analyzing
this factor, the court was not persuaded by Walgreen's promise to use
the premises as a "drugstore only."2' The court interpreted this as giv-
ing the tenant two options under the lease: "(1) refrain from using the
premises; or (2) use the premises [as specified]."'
Like Michigan, Minnesota does not believe the presence of a
noncompetition covenant on the landlord weighs in favor of finding an
implied covenant of continuous operation.m In Plaza Associates, the
tenant had the exclusive right to operate a drugstore in the mall.2 The
court stated: "[t]he fact that appellant [landlord] agreed not to allow
any other drugstores in the mall does not indicate an implied covenant
by Walgreen [tenant] to use the space for the full term of the lease."' 7
R. Mississippi
Mississippi courts do not seem to have a factor test to apply to
implied covenants of continuous operation.' Mississippi, however,
looks at the terms of the lease to determine if there is some language
in the lease that could be interpreted as essentially containing a cove-
nant of continuous operation29
For instance, in Kroger Co. v. Chimneyville Props., Ltd.,290 the
lease stated: "[n]otwithstanding any assignment or sublease, or any
vacating of the demised premises by Tenant, Tenant shall remain fully
liable on this Lease." 29' The court found that this language implied the
opposite of a covenant of continuous operation, in other words, that
the tenant had the express right to vacate the premises.29 The Chim-
neyville court also focused on a term in the lease that said that the lan-
dlord's covenant not to lease to competitors of the tenant expired if
282. Id. at 730.
283. Id.
284. Id. (internal citations omitted).
285. See id. at 730.
286. Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 730.
287. Id.
288. See Kroger Co. v. Chimneyvifle Props., Ltd., 784 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Miss.
1991).
289. See id. 346-47. See also TOC Retail, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Oil Co., 886 F. Supp.
1306, 1313 (E.D. La. 1995) (interpreting Mississippi law).
290. 784 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
291. Id. at 347 (emphasis omitted).
292. Id.
[Vol. 31
IMPLIED COVENANTS
the tenant ceased conducting a business on the premises for a period
of 180 days or longer.293
S. Missouri
Missouri has an interesting set of case law highlighted by an
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case interpreting Missouri law that
has been criticized by a Missouri state court2 4 Though Missouri has
case law on implied covenants of continuous operation, Missouri does
not appear to have developed a formulaic approach to analyzing these
cases.
295
In EMRO Marketing Co. v. Plemmons,296 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals interpreted Missouri law to find an implied covenant of
continuous operation.' In reaching its conclusion, the EMRO court
relied on several terms in the lease at issue.2' First, the court found the
presence of a restriction in the lease limiting the tenant's use of the
premises for a Nickerson Farms store to be persuasive for implying a
covenant.299 Second, the court was persuaded by the fact that the lease
relied primarily upon percentage rent (the monthly fixed rent was
$100).300 The court did not find the tenant's right to sublease or assign
the lease to be persuasive in the analysis. 1 The court was also not per-
suaded by a clause in the lease allowing the tenant to remove build-
ings, fixtures and other improvements, though the court's dismissal of
this term may have specifically related to the fact that the landlord
might perceive the improvements in question as a burden because
they were components of a retail gasoline station.02
In Giessow Restaurants, Inc. v. Richmond Restaurants, Inc.,3°3 the
Missouri Court of Appeals criticized the EMRO decision and stated
that it ignored applicable Missouri law.a°4 The Missouri Court of Ap-
peals stated "the mere fact that a rental provision of a lease was based
upon a combination of fixed rent and a percentage rent is insufficient
293. Id.
294. See EMRO Mktg. Co. v. Plemmons, 855 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1988).
295. See id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 530.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. EMRO, 855 F.2d at 530.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. 232 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
304. Id. at 579-80.
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to find an implied covenant of continued use."' The court stated that
"[i]n fact, Missouri courts consistently refuse to find implied covenants
in clearly drafted leases. '" The court held that the mere presence of a
term restricting the tenant's use of the premises does not give rise to
an implied covenant of continuous operation.30' The court also distin-
guished the EMRO decision by pointing out that the case at bar had
fixed rent of $25,000 per year with percentage rent of 7% of gross
sales between $357,142 and $962,391 and an additional 7% of gross
sales in excess of $962,391, not to exceed $20,000 .3' The Missouri
Court of Appeals found this amount of fixed rent to be "substan-
tial."3°9
Missouri also finds the presence of a merger clause in a contract
to weigh heavily against finding an implied covenant of continuous
operation.310 According to Missouri, "[t]he existence of a merger
clause is a strong indication on the face of the contract that the writing
is intended to be complete.,
311
T. Nevada
Nevada primarily relies on Arizona's approach to covenants of
continuous operation.31 ' A federal district court interpreting Nevada
law pointed out the reliance on Arizona law and also added that,
[u]nder Nevada state law, the Court may conclude that an implied
provision to use space for a particular purpose exists where (1) the
implied duty arises from the language used; (2) where the implied
duty appears from that language that it was so clearly within the
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to
express it; (3) where the implied duty is justified on the grounds of
305. Id. at 580 (citing Crestwood Plaza, Inc. v. Kroger, 520 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974)).
306. Giessow, 232 S.W.3d at 580.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See Adbar Co., L.C. v. PCAA Mo., LLC, No. 4:06-CV-1689, 2008 WL 68858,
at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2008).
311. Id. at *4.
312. Supra Part IV.B. See Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 772 P.2d 1284,
1285 (Nev., 1989). See also Interface Group - Nevada, Inc. v. Men's Apparel Guild in
Cal. Inc., No. 2:04-CV-00351-BES-GWF, 2007 WL 923952, at *6 (D. Nev. March 23,
2007).
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legal necessity; and (4) where it can be rightfully assumed that it
would have been made if attention had been called to it.
313
This last quoted portion is essentially the Standard Factors.314
U. New Jersey
New Jersey implies a covenant of continuous operation when the
lease contains a percentage rent clause or "where there are other cir-
cumstances sufficiently evidencing the intention of the parties that the
lessee will be under a mandate to operate reasonably within the terms
of the lease., 315 New Jersey cited (with approval) a Texas court when
it said:
[w]e think it is common knowledge that the volume of pedestrian
traffic at the site of a retail merchandising business is a factor which
affects the gross sales potential of the business. That being so the
purpose and the importance to appellants of the lease provisions
with reference to a supermarket are obvious. Plainly the parties in-
tended that a supermarket should be in operation during the term
of the lease. We find it impossible to believe that when the parties
entered into this lease agreement it was intended that the particu-
lar lease provision in question would be satisfied if A. C. F. Wrigley
Stores should continue to pay rent on an idle store building after
discontinuing operation of the supermarket.316
New Jersey does not have a formal set of factors but looks at the
terms of the lease.317 For instance, in Ingannamorte v. Kings Super
Markets., Inc.,318 the court considered the following factors: (i) that the
lease specified was for a supermarket; (ii) that the landlord had to en-
force a noncompetitive restriction to protect the tenant in the re-
mainder of the shopping center;* and (iii) that the landlord was re-
313. Interface Group, 2007 WL 923952, at *6.
314. See generally Lippman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d at 779 (Cal. 1955).
Notably, the Nevada District Court left off the last of the five factors but included the
rest. From the context of the court's decision in Interface Group, however, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the court meant to limit or modify the Standard Factors with this
omission.
315. Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Mkts., Inc., 260 A.2d 841, 843-44 (N.J. 1970).
See Tooley's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Chrisanthopouls, 260 A.2d 845, 848 (N.J. 1970).
316. Ingannamorte, 260 A.2d at 844 (citing Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Tex. Co.,
383 S.W.2d 193,196 (Tex. App. 1964).
317. See Ingannamorte, 260 A.2d 841.
318. Id.
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quired to maintain parking for the tenant.319 The court determined that
those provisions implied that the parties did not intend for the tenant's
building to be an "idle store building. 3 20
V. New York
New York may find an implied covenant of continuous operation
under certain circumstances. 321 New York takes the following stance
on contracts:
[t]hat a particular provision has not been expressly stated in a con-
tract does not necessarily mean that no such covenant exists. As
was eloquently stated by Judge Cardozo, "[tihe law has outgrown
its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the so-
vereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view
to-day. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may
be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed."32
New York examines the rental provisions when analyzing implied
covenants of continuous operation." If there is a percentage rent
clause, New York may find the percentage rent clause to be "a prom-
ise to use reasonable efforts to bring profits into existence."324 The par-
ty asserting the existence of an implied covenant, however, "bears a
heavy burden, for it is not the function of the courts to remake the
contract agreed to by the parties, but rather to enforce it as it exists."'32
New York will probably not imply a covenant unless the lease places
"unusual restrictions upon the uses of the premises. 3 26 New York also
looks at the sophistication of the parties negotiating the lease and the
comprehensiveness of the lease.
319. Id. at 844.
320. Id.
321. See Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc, 46 N.Y.2d 62, 69 (N.Y. 1978).
322. Id.
323. See Goldberg, 168-05 Corp. v. Levy, 9 N.Y.S.2d 304, 306 (N.Y. App. Div.
1938).
324. Id. (citations omitted).
325. Rowe, 46 N.Y.2d at 69.
326. Id. at 70.
327. See id. at 72.
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W. North Carolina
North Carolina does not appear to have a formal set of factors for
determining when to imply a covenant of continuous operation.
s2
North Carolina, however, will not find an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation when the lease (i) contains sufficient fixed rent to
compensate the landlord for its investment in the property;3 29 or (ii)
contains no, or limited, restrictions on use of the leased premises."'
If the lease contains a provision allowing the premises to be used
for any lawful purpose, then the tenant is not required to conduct
business on the premises for the full term of the lease.33 Also, if the
lease allows unfettered subletting or assignment, the tenant probably
does not have an implied obligation to continuously operate the pre-
mises.332
X. Ohio
Ohio starts its analysis of implied covenants of continuous opera-
tion with the Standard Factors.333 Ohio also looks at the sufficiency of
fixed rent as compared to the percentage rent.3 4 Ohio courts hold that,
[w]here a lease provides for rental based on a percentage of sales
with a fixed substantial adequate minimum, and there is no express
covenant or agreement to occupy and use the premises, no implied
covenant or agreement will be inferred that the lessee is bound to
occupy and use the premises for the purpose expressed in the
lease.333
Furthermore, Ohio examines whether the parties "industriously" ne-
gotiated and drafted the lease to cover all terms.336 A federal court
interpreting Ohio law noted several factors that might be considered
in the analysis: (i) whether the issue was discussed during lease negoti-
328. See Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 226 S.E.2d 232, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976);
Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 and 25 cent Stores, 197 S.E. 174, 175 (N.C. 1938).
329. Jenkins, 197 S.E. at 175; Lowe's, 226 S.E.2d at 234.
330. Forrest Drive Assocs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 576, 584-85
(M.D.N.C. 1999).
331. See Lowe's, 226 S.E.2d at 234.
332. See id.
333. See Kretch v. Stark, 193 N.E.2d 307, 315 (Ohio Misc. 1962).
334. See id at 315-16.
335. Id. at 316.
336. See id.
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ations; (ii) whether the fixed rent is substantial; and (iii) whether the
parties in the transaction were sophisticated. "'
Oklahoma courts are reluctant to imply a covenant of continuous
operation in the absence of express language.338 Oklahoma does not
appear to have a formal set of factors to consider and the case law is
limited." Oklahoma starts with the general rule that
(1) the [implied] obligation must arise from the presumed intention
of the parties as gathered from the language used in the written in-
strument itself or it must appear from the contract as a whole that
the obligation is indispensible in order to give effect to the intent of
the parties; and (2) it must have been so clearly within the contem-
plation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express
i.340it.
In United Associates, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., '1 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Oklahoma law and refused to
find a covenant of continuous operation when: (i) the lease had fixed
rent of $104,595 per year in addition to the percentage rent; (ii) the
tenant had the right to assign or sublet without the consent of the lan-
dlord; (iii) the lease had a use clause stating, '"[i]t is understood and
agreed that the Demised Premises will be used by Lessee in the opera-
tion of a discount department store, but Lessor agrees the Demised
Premises may be used for any lawful purpose' except as a supermarket
or grocery store;" (iv) the tenant had the right to remove any and all
fixtures at any time; (v) the tenant, including its assignees and subles-
sees, had the right to make alterations to the premises for business
purposes; (vi) the lease's default clause was triggered if the premises
were deserted for more than 30 days; and (vii) when the lease con-
tained an merger clause.342 The court did not apportion weight to the
factors or state whether any of the factors were irrelevant. 3 The court
noted, however, that the clause prohibiting the tenant from deserting
the premises for more than thirty days seemed to weigh in favor of
finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.!" Nevertheless,
337. Hamilton W. Dev., Ltd. v. Hills Stores Co., 959 F. Supp. 434, 440-41 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
338. See In re Okla. Plaza Investors, Inc., 203 B.R. 479, 484 (N.D. Okla. 1994)
(interpreting Oklahoma law and overturning a decision by the bankruptcy court).
339. See Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523,530 (Okla. 1985).
340. Id. at 530.
341. 133 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997).
342. United Associates, 133 F.3d at 1297.
343. See id.
344. Id. at 1298.
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the court stated that the lease "'must be considered as a whole so as to
give effect to all its provisions without narrowly concentrating upon
some clause or language taken out of context.""'3 5 Therefore, the court
found that this clause alone did not change the balance of the other
facts.346
Oklahoma courts also seem to focus on whether the tenant has
the right to assign or sublease and the breadth of the permitted uses
under the lease.347 Oklahoma courts will probably not find an implied
covenant of continuous operation if the tenant has broad assignment
and use rights.' Furthermore, Oklahoma courts will not find the im-
plied covenant if the fixed rent is "substantial" and "adequate. 34 9 Al-
so, in Oklahoma, the existence of a merger clause could negate finding
an implied covenant of continuous operation." °
Furthermore, Oklahoma will not imply a covenant of continuous
operation if the lease is comprehensive. As the court in Mercury Inv.
Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.351 pointed out:
[t]he lease is cast in the form of a highly sophisticated document
employing clear, precise and unambiguous language that covers a
myriad of details regarding the parties' relationship as landlord vis-
a-vis tenant. In the fact of its comprehensive terms, this court is
powerless to add a covenant requiring Woolworth [the tenant] to
generate sales that would subject it to liability for percentage ren-
tals.352
Z. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania also appears not to have a formal set of factors for
analyzing implied covenants of continuous operations.3 In analyzing
these cases, even when the terms are not ambiguous, Pennsylvania
starts with
345. Id. (quoting Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Ok-
la. 1985)).
346. United Associates, 133 F.3d at 1298.
347. See Okla. Plaza Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 F.3d 1179, 1180 (10th
Cir. 1998).
348. See id.
349. See Monte Corp. v. Stephens, 324 P.2d 538, 538 (Okla. 1958). See also Mer-
cury, 706 P.2d at 531.
350. See United Associates, 133 F.3d at 1297-98.
351. 706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985).
352. Id. at 532.
353. See Slater v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 546 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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[T]he doctrine of necessary implication, which has been described
as follows: In the absence of an express provision, the law will imp-
ly an agreement by the parties to a contract to do and perform
those things that according to reason and justice they should do in
order to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made and
to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.354
Pennsylvania recognizes the concept that a clause in a lease re-
quiring a specific use may imply a covenant of continuous operation
because such a clause does not contemplate a permanently idle store
front.5 ' Pennsylvania noted with approval a landlord's argument that
courts should recognize the "economic interdependence" among a
"key tenant" and the other tenants of a shopping center.356 Pennsylva-
nia may also interpret a lease clause limiting the amount of time that
the premises can be vacant as implying a covenant of continuous op-
eration.357
AA. Rhode Island
Rhode Island does not appear to have a formal set of factors for
analyzing implied covenants of continuous operation."' Rhode Island
seems to take the approach that a ground lease where the tenant has
the right to remove improvements (i.e., fixtures) prohibits finding an
implied covenant of continuous operation.35' Also, Rhode Island may
not find the implied covenant when the lease has substantial fixed
rent."u Rhode Island takes the general approach to implied covenants
expressed by Oklahoma in Monte and Mercury.
3 61
354. Id. (citations omitted).
355. See id. at 678-79.
356. McKnight-Seibert Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Nat'l Tea Co., 397 A.2d 1214, 1217
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
357. See Slater, 546 A.2d at 680. Cf. United Associates, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 133 F.3d 1296, 1298 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that a clause prohibiting the tenant
from deserting the leased premises for more than thirty days as weighing in favor of
finding an implied covenant of continuous operation).
358. See Aneluca Assocs. v. Lombardi, 620 A.2d 88,91 (R.I. 1993).
359. See id.
360. See id. (noting the fixed rent was $8,400 with percentage rent at 3% of gross
income in excess of $280,000 per year).
361. Id. at 91-92 (following the holdings in Monte Corp. v. Stephens, 324 P.2d 538
(Okla. 1958); and Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523 (Okla.
1985)).
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BB. South Carolina
South Carolina starts its analysis by trying to "determine the situ-
ation of the parties, as well as their purposes, at the time the contract
was entered."362 South Carolina will imply a covenant in a lease "that
according to reason and justice should be done to carry out the pur-
pose for which the contract was made." 363
South Carolina recognizes the role that anchor tenants play to
draw customers into a shopping center and note that the "use of one
or more anchor tenants to bring customers to the smaller shops in a
shopping center is a common practice. ' '364 South Carolina noted that
"[i]f the anchor tenant were permitted to leave the premises vacant,
the landlord's purpose for signing the lease would be defeated."
'36
Thus, South Carolina may take a different approach to implied cove-
nants of continuous operation for anchor tenants than smaller te-
nants.3' This is similar to the approach of Pennsylvania and New Jer-
sey, which look at the economic role of the lease and the landlord's
intention that the property not be left "idle.
367
CC. Tennessee
Tennessee begins its analysis of implied covenants of continuous
operation by examining the Standard Factors.3' According to Tennes-
see,
"[c]ontracts implied in law, or more properly quasi or constructive
contracts, are a class of obligations which are imposed or created
by law without the assent of the party bound, on the ground that
362. Columbia E. Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 261 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
See also United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 866,
868 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting an express covenant of continuous operation).
363. Columbia, 386 S.E.2d at 262.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See id.
367. Cf Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Mkts., Inc., 260 A.2d 841, 843-44 (N.J.
1970); Slater v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 546 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct.1988).
368. See BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-
9710-CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (rev'd on
other grounds by BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48
S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2001)).
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they are dictated by reason and justice and which are allowed to be
enforced by an action ex contractu."369
Further, before courts will imply a term in a contract, "it must appear
therefrom that it was so clearly in the contemplation of the parties that
they deemed it unnecessary to express it, or that it is necessary to imp-
ly such covenant in order to give effect to the purpose of the contract
as a whole."37 In addition, "[t]he decision whether to imply a covenant
of continuous operation must be evaluated at the time the parties
signed the agreement."37' Furthermore, Tennessee utilizes the six fac-
tors from the Lagrew case."'
A percentage rent clause is not required to find an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation, but a lease with a percentage rent clause
is more likely to contain the implied covenant.373 "[T]he major prere-
quisite for a finding of an implied covenant in a percentage rental
agreement is that the stipulated minimum rental must not be substan-
tial consideration. 374 The landlord has the burden of proving that the
disparity between the fixed rent and the fair rental value is so great as
to justify an implied covenant of continuous operation .37 According to
Tennessee, "[t]he 'substantial-insubstantial' question is tied closely to
market value in the law governing implied covenants of continuous
operation., 376 The fixed rent, however, has to be more than just no-
minal.377 Furthermore, "even if there is a more than nominal minimum
rent, other circumstances such as that the fixed rent is significantly
below the fair market value of the property might justify the conclu-
sion that the parties intended that the lessor have the benefit of the
percentage rent throughout the term.
3 78
Like some other states, Tennessee holds that "[t]he presence of a
right to assign or sublet is not necessarily inconsistent with an implied
covenant of continuous operation. The two covenants can be harmo-
369. BVT, 1999 WL 236273, at *6 (citations omitted).
370. Id. at *7.
371. Id. at *8 (quoting Nalle v. Taco Bell Corp., 914 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1996)).
372. See BVT, 1999 WL 236273, at *12-13. Cf. Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905
F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995)).
373. See BVT., 1999 WL 236273, at *7.
374. Id. at *8 (citation omitted).
375. See id. at *7. See also Kroger Co. v. Chem. Sec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 468, 471
(Tenn. 1975) (stating the landlord "bears a heavy burden in proving the lease contains
an implied covenant of continuous occupancy." Id.).
376. BVT, 1999 WL 236273, at *9.
377. See id. at *9-10.
378. Id. at *10.
[Vol. 31
IMPLIED COVENANTS
nized to permit subletting or assignment to a business of the same cha-
racter."3 79
Tennessee does not find the presence of a noncompetitive restric-
tion on the landlord persuasive in the analysis. In Kroger Co. v. Chem-
ical Securities Co. , the landlord was prohibited from leasing any oth-
er property in the shopping center to another grocery store.381 The
court held that the "restriction on competition written into the lease is
not broad enough to give birth to implied covenants of continuous
occupancy and operation of a grocery business ....
DD. Texas
Texas starts with the general rule that implied covenants are dis-
favored. 3 Such a covenant will only be implied if it is "necessary in
order to make the contract fair, or that without such a covenant it
would be improvident or unwise, or that the contract would operate
unjustly."3" In another case, however, a lower court said Texas "will
not imply a covenant simply because it is needed to make the contract
fair, wise, or just."3' Texas also considers whether the lease agreement
is comprehensive and covers a variety of terms.3" The decision wheth-
er to imply the covenant is evaluated at the time the parties signed the
lease.3"
Texas will typically only find an implied covenant of continuous
operation if the percentage rent is the only (or nearly only) source of
rent for the landlord."8 It is unclear, however, whether the fixed rent
has to be "adequate," as Texas has not decided whether to apply the
California rule that the fixed rent must be adequate.389
In addition, Texas will not find an implied covenant of continuous
operation just because the lease says the tenant "shall" operate a cer-
379. Id. at *11.
380. 526 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. 1975).
381. Id. at 472.
382. Id.
383. See Nalle v.Taco Bell Corp., 914 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App. 1996).
384. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. of Tex. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1941).
385. Nalle, 914 S.W.2d at 687.
386. See id. at 688.
387. See id.
388. See id. See also Marvin Drug Co. v. Couch, 134 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
389. See Nalle, 914 S.W.2d at 688-89.
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tain business.3"° The "shall" language does not create an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation under Texas law.39'
Texas also considers the economic interdependence of the par-
ties. In Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Tex. Co.,39 the court found an im-
plied covenant of continuous operation when the court determined
that the landlord was depending on the pedestrian traffic generated by
a grocery store to help the entire shopping center. 93 Based on this de-
cision, it appears that Texas is more likely to find an implied covenant
of continuous operation if the landlord is an anchor for the shopping
center.3 '94
EE. Utah
Utah will find an implied covenant of continuous operation only
under "extreme circumstances" when supported by "substantial evi-
dence., 395 There are two circumstances where Utah may find an im-
plied covenant of continuous operation: "(1) where there is 'plain and
unmistakeable language in the relevant contracts which would support
the restrictive covenant'; and (2) where there is a 'legal necessity' to
imply a restrictive covenant 'to effectuate the intent of the parties."'
396
Utah considers several factors to determine if there is an implied co-
venant of continuous operation.7
The first factor is whether the lease contains a percentage rent
clause.39' Like Texas, a percentage rent clause is not absolutely re-
quired to find an implied covenant of continuous operation, but the
absence of such a clause will make it difficult to imply the covenant .
The second factor is whether the lease contains a restrictive "use
of premises" clause.' If the "use of premises" clause is broad, then it
indicates the parties did not contemplate requiring the tenant to re-
main continuously open."
390. See Daniel G. Kamin Kilgore Enters. v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 81 Fed.
Appx. 827, 830 (5th Cir. 2003).
391. See id. at 830-31
392. 383 S.W. 2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
393. Id. at 196.
394. See id.
395. See Oakwood Viii. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1233 (Utah 2004).
396. Id. (internal citations omitted).
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. See id. at 1233-34.
400. See id. at 1234.
401. See Oakwood Village, 104 P.3d at 1234.
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The third factor is whether the tenant can sublet or assign the
lease without the landlord's consent and without restriction on the
type of sublessees or assigns.O If the tenant has broad subletting or
assignment rights, then Utah is less likely to imply a covenant of con-
tinuous operation.'
The fourth factor is whether the tenant owns the fixtures and has
the right to remove them at any time.4 According to Utah, the right
to remove the fixtures during the lease is not consistent with an im-
plied covenant of continuous operation.'
The fifth factor is whether the landlord has the right to reenter
and relet the premises in the event the tenant vacates the premises.'
If the landlord has such a right, then Utah believes it is inconsistent
with finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.'
The sixth factor, which likely would not apply to many cases, is
whether the tenant had an obligation to construct the leased build-
ing.' In Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc.,4 the tenant leased
vacant land but did not have a contractual obligation to build a build-
ing on the land.410 This lack of a requirement helped the court deter-
mine that there was not an implied covenant of continuous opera-
tion.4
The seventh factor is whether the lease is a ground lease.4 2 Ac-
cording to the court in Oakwood Village, "[a] ground lease. . . is dif-
ferent from an ordinary commercial lease." 13 The court further stated
that "[t]he law has clearly established that a tenant has significantly
more flexibility and control over the premises under a ground lease
than it has under a building lease. Indeed, 'a ground lease is best con-
sidered as a financing device for developing unimproved land.
'
'
41 4
402. See id.
403. See id. at 1234-35.
404. See id. at 1235.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. See Oakwood Village, 104 P.3d at 1235.
408. See id.
409. 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004).
410. Id. at 1235.
411. Id. at 1236.
412. See id. at 1238.
413. Id.
414. Oakwood Village LLC, 104 P.3d at 1239.
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FF. Washington
Washington courts start with the proposition that
implied covenants are not favored in the law; and courts will dec-
lare the same to exist only when there is a satisfactory basis in the
express contract of the parties which makes it necessary to imply
certain duties and obligations in order to effect the purposes of the
parties to the contract made.415
Courts will only find implied covenants if there is a "legal necessity
arising from the terms of the contract, or the substance thereof, and
the circumstances attending its execution; and the implication from
the words must be such as will clearly authorize the inference of an
imputation in law of the creation of a covenant. 4 16 Washington then
applies the Standard Factors.417
In cases with percentage rent clauses, Washington courts ask
"whether the parties regarded the amount of the stipulated minimum
rental [i.e., fixed rent] as an adequate reflection of the full rental value
of the premises, or whether they contemplated the full value would be
realized only through the percentage provision., 411 If the fixed rent
was "adequate," then the court is unlikely to imply a covenant of con-
tinuous operation.4 19 Also, the existence of a merger clause could hurt
finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.4 ' °
GG. West Virginia
West Virginia uses a well-defined set of factors for analyzing im-
plied covenants of continuous operation that are synthesized from
West Virginia's review of the disparate factors used in other states.421
West Virginia courts hold that the following factors should be re-
viewed:
1) whether the lease contains an inconsistent express term or a
provision for a substantial fixed base rent; 2) whether the lease
contains a provision giving the tenant free assignability of the lease;
415. Fuller Mkt. Basket, Inc. v. Gillingham & Jones, Inc., 539 P.2d 868, 872 (Wa.
Ct. App. 1975).
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 617 P.2d 704 (Wash. 1980).
419. See id. at 711.
420. See Fuller, 539 P.2d. at 872.
421. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 140-41 (W. Va. 1991).
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3) whether the lease was actively negotiated by all parties involved;
422
and, 4) whether the lease contains a noncompetitive provision.
For the first factor, West Virginia looks at whether the fixed rent
is substantial and, if it is, then the factor weighs against finding the
implied covenant.22 West Virginia also looks for conflicting terms.424 In
Thompson Development, Inc. v Kroger Co.,42 the court examined the
provision in the lease that said: "No obligation not stated herein shall
be imposed on either party hereto., 426 The court found that this mer-
ger clause conflicted with finding the implied covenant.42 Other ex-
amples in West Virginia of terms that are inconsistent with finding an
implied covenant of continuous operation are: (i) a term allowing the
tenant to remove fixtures at will; and (ii) a term stating that the tenant
makes no representations or warranties regarding the sales it expects
to make in the leased premises.42
Arguably, West Virginia should divide this first factor into two
separate factors because the court is really looking for two different
things. Even though having substantial rent could be considered an
inconsistent express term, there are other inconsistent terms that the
court will consider.
For the second factor, West Virginia examines assignment
rights. 429 In Thompson Development, Inc. v. Kroger Co.,4 ° the court
determined that this factor weighed against finding an implied cove-
nant because the tenant had the right to assign the premises without
landlord consent; the assignment provision did not obligate the tenant
to sublet only to another supermarket, and the lease only mandated
that the premises be used for a lawful purpose and not be in conflict
with exclusive rights granted to other tenants in the shopping center.431
For the third factor, if the lease is actively negotiated, then this
factor will weigh against finding an implied covenant of continuous
422. Id. at 141.
423. See id. (finding $6,438.17 fixed rent substantial compared to a smaller amount
of percentage rent).
424. See id.
425. 413 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1991).
426. Id. at 141.
427. Id. See also Frederick Bus. Props. Co. v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 445 S.E.2d
176, 181 (W. Va. 1994).
428. See Frederick, 445 S.E.2d at 181-82.
429. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1991).
430. Id.
431. Id.
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operation. '32 In Thompson, the court noted a lawyer, an accountant,
and a real estate broker assisted in the lease negotiations.33 This heavy
involvement by sophisticated advisors weighed against the landlord.
For the fourth factor, the court examines whether the landlord is
restricted from leasing to competitors, with the lack of such restric-
tions weighing against finding the implied covenant.4" In Thompson, a
noncompetitive restriction burdened the landlord, but the tenant re-
leased the landlord from the obligation.435 By releasing the landlord,
the court found that this factor was "of slight import" in deciding the
issue.4" Even if the restriction remained, however, it may not have
changed the outcome of the factor test. According to West Virginia,
"[t]he mere existence of a noncompetition clause, in and of itself, does
not require a court to find an implied covenant of continuous opera-
tion in a lease. 437
HH. Wisconsin
Wisconsin is one of the most conservative states when it comes to
finding implied covenants of continuous operation." Wisconsin holds
"that a commercial lessee cannot be forced to continuously operate a
business in the absence of a clear, express provision in the lease re-
quiring continuous operation."4 9
Even if the lease restricts the property to only one specific use,
Wisconsin will still not find a continuous use obligation." For in-
stance, in Brugman v. Noyes,"1 a Wisconsin court said that a restric-
tion limiting a leased property to use as cabinet warerooms did not
compel the tenant to stay continuously open.42 In Henry Rahr's Sons
Co. v Buckley,443 a Wisconsin court similarly refused to find a covenant
to stay continuously open just because the property was restricted to
432. See id. at 141-42.
433. Id. at 142.
434. See id.
435. Thompson, 413 S.E.2d at 142.
436. Id.
437. Frederick Bu. Props. Co. v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 176, 181
(W. Va. 1994).
438. See Sampson Invs. by Sampson v. Jondex Corp., 499 N.W.2d 177, 183 (Wis.
1993).
439. Id. See also Rapids Assocs. v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 668, 670-71
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
440. See Sampson, 499 N.W.2d at 180.
441. 6 Wis. 1 (Wis. 1857).
442. Id. at 6.
443. 150 N.W. 994 (Wis. 1915).
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use as a hotel and salon." Wisconsin is very unlikely to find an im-
plied covenant of continuous operation in most instances because "the
burden that these clauses place on the lessee is so great as to require a
clear statement of intent before imposing continuous operation." 5
Although a Wisconsin court is unlikely to ever find an implied
covenant of continuous use, the court will also look for terms that it
believes should usually be in a lease where the parties intended a con-
tinuous operating covenant."4 For example, courts look for provisions
that set forth the required days and hours of operation, the required
level of staffing, the required stock of merchandise and the conditions
under which the tenant might justifiably cease operations." 7
II. Wyoming
Wyoming takes an approach that is nearly the opposite of Wis-
consin. Whereas Wisconsin does not equate a use restriction with a
covenant of continuous operation, Wyoming looks heavily at the use
restrictions in the lease." According to a Wyoming court:
A paramount purpose, from a lessor's standpoint, is said to be the
amount of rent to be received, and when that amount is variable
and conditioned upon the use to be made of the leased premises,
words relating to the use intended are of primary importance and
must be construed and interpreted to have been intended as an ex-
press covenant that the occupancy specified shall be continued dur-
ing the entire lease period so as to provide a constant base upon
which the agreed rent formula may be applied and the rent com-
puted.449
In Ayres Jewelry Co. v 0 & S Building,5 ° the tenant was restricted
to using the property "for a jewelry shop, and for no other purpose
whatsoever unless the written consent of Lessor is first and obtained
thereto."451 Based on this restriction, the court found an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation.452 The court stated that:
444. Id. at 996.
445. Sampson, 499 N.W.2d at 181.
446. See id. at 182.
447. See id. at 182-83.
448. See id. Cf Ayres Jewelry Co. v. 0 & S Bldg., 419 P.2d 628, 632 (Wyo. 1966).
449. Ayres Jewelry, 419 P.2d at 632.
450. 419 P.2d 628 (Wyo. 1966).
451. Id. at 629 (citing a contract provision between the parties).
452. Id.
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The evident and plain intention of the parties is that the lessor
would receive for its store a rental computed upon the gross sales
of a jewelry shop conducted therein. That intention furnishes un-
mistakable guideline [sic] justifying the interpretation of the words
used in the leasehold as being an express covenant that the leased
premises be continuously used during the lease period as and for
the conduct of a jewelry shop.453
V. TRENDS IN ANALYZING IMPLIED COVENANTS OF CONTINUOUS
OPERATION
There are trends that can be discerned from the cases examined
in the foregoing section. It appears that there are four different for-
mal factor tests applied by the states (five if you count the Standard
Factors that several states use as a starting point for the analysis). Al-
though the majority of states have not adopted one of the formal fac-
tor tests, states consider many of the same factors, even though there
is significant disagreement on how to weigh some of the factors. Even
the states that have formal factor tests tend to look at a variety of oth-
er issues in their analysis. This section will first consider the available
formal factor tests then discuss the other factors frequently examined
by courts.
A. The Factor Tests
Some states use more formal factor tests than others. Several
states use the Standard Factors plus some additional factors to analyze
implied covenants of continuous operation. Four relatively well-
defined factor tests specific to implied covenants of continuous opera-
tion have emerged. For purposes of this article, I am calling the four
formal factor tests the Kentucky Test, the Georgia Test, the Minneso-
ta Test, and the West Virginia Test.4"
The Standard Factors are discussed at the beginning of this ar-
ticle, so I will not repeat the discussion in this section.45 There appear,
however, to be six states that begin their analysis with the Standard
Factors: Arizona, California, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee, and Washing-
ton.
4 5 6
453. Id. at 632.
454. See supra Part IV.M (Kentucky Test); Part IV.G (Georgia Test); Part IV.Q
(Minnesota Test); Part IV.GG (West Virginia Test).
455. See supra Part II.
456. See First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 729 P.2d 938, 940 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986);
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1. The Kentucky Test
The Kentucky Test is the most landlord-friendly test.457 The Ken-
tucky Test looks at the following factors:
1. Whether the base rent is below market value;
2. Whether percentage payments are substantial in relation to base
rent;
3. Whether the term of the lease is lengthy;
4. Whether the tenant may sublet;
5. Whether the tenant has rights to fixtures; and
6. Whether the lease contains a noncompetitive provision.458
Under the Kentucky Test, the first factor weighs in favor of im-
plying the covenant if the base rent is below market value 9.4  The
second factor weighs in favor of finding the implied covenant if the
percentage payments are substantial in relation to base rent. ' The
third factor weighs in favor of finding an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation if the term of the lease is lengthy. 1 The fourth factor
weighs in favor of implying the covenant of continuous operation if
the right to sublet or assign is somehow limited (either by requiring
the landlord's consent or limiting the range of permitted transfe-
rees).462 The fifth factor weighs in favor of implying the covenant if the
Brentwood Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-16387, 2000 WL 734384, at *1
(9th Cir. June 7, 2000); Interface Group - Nevada, Inc. v. Men's Apparel Guild in Cal.
Inc., No. 2:04-CV-00351-BES-GWF, 2007 WL 923952, at *6 (D. Nev. March 23, 2007);
BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9710-
CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999); Fuller Mkt. Basket,
Inc. v. Gillingham & Jones, Inc., 539 P.2d 868,872 (Wa. Ct. App. 1975).
457. See, e.g. , Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401, 407 (E.D. Ky.
1995) (finding an implied covenant of continuous operation using the Kentucky Test);
Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 925 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (find-
ing an implied covenant of continuous operation using the Kentucky Test); BVT Leb-
anon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9710-CV00607, 1999
WL 236273, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (finding an implied covenant of
continuous operation using the Kentucky Test).
458. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. at 405. See also Pequot, 698 A.2d at 923-24.
459. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. at 406.
460. See id.
461. See Pequot, 698 A.2d at 924.
462. See id. See also BVT, 1999 WL 236273, at *13.
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tenant does not have the right to remove the fixtures at will."6 3 The
sixth factor weighs in favor of implying the covenant if the lease im-
poses a noncompetitive use restriction on the landlord.464
Both Connecticut and Tennessee follow the Kentucky Test.65 The
Kentucky Test was also listed (but not exactly followed) in Arkansas'
Patton decision.6 The Kentucky Test is not, however, universally fol-
lowed. For instance, Utah strongly criticized the Kentucky Test in
Oakwood Village.467 The Utah court stated that:
[Clontrary to the trial court's decision in Lagrew [which announced
the Kentucky Test], appellate courts throughout the United States
have almost universally held that "a lease provision granting the
tenant the right to assign his lease or sublet the premises is incon-
sistent with an obligation on the part of the tenant to continuously
operate his business on the premises." The decision in Lagrew,
therefore, is an anomaly and fails to persuade us to follow its lead
toward a conclusion that almost every other court would reject.468
2. The Georgia Test
Unlike the Kentucky Test, the Georgia Test is more tenant-
friendly. The Georgia Test factors are as follows:
1. Whether the lease provides the tenant can use the premises in
any other lawful manner;
2. Whether the lease is freely assignable;
3. Whether the lease contains a provision that the tenant pays a
percentage of revenue as rent.469
Under the Georgia Test, the first factor weighs against implying
the covenant of continuous operation if the lease permits the tenant to
use the premises in any lawful manner.470 The second factor weighs
463. See Pequot, 698 A.2d at 924.
464. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. at 407.
465. See Pequot, 698 A.2d at 923-24; BVT, 1999 WL 236273, at *12-13.
466. See William L. Patton, Jr. Family Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Simon Prop. Group,
Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 846,849 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
467. Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1237 (Utah 2004).
468. Id. (internal citations omitted).
469. DPLM, Ltd. v. J.H. Harvey Co., 526 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1999).
470. See id.
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against implying the covenant if the lease is freely assignable.471 The
third factor weighs against implying the covenant if the lease does not
contain a provision that the tenant owes percentage rent.472
Unfortunately for Georgia, no other state appears to be expressly
following the Georgia Test. There does not appear to be any case law
outside of Georgia discussing the Georgia Test or its application.
Moreover, the Georgia Test is rather weak because it only considers
three factors and omits many issues that are deemed important in oth-
er states. For instance, the Georgia Test does not address the meaning
of a noncompetitive use restriction on the landlord, the disposition of
fixtures, the economic interdependence of the parties, or the compre-
hensiveness of the lease.
3. The Minnesota Test
The Minnesota Test is more tenant-friendly than the Kentucky
Test but more comprehensive than the Georgia Test. 3 Minnesota
does not provide a numbered list of factors, but it has a clearly defined
set of factors that it considers. 74 The Minnesota factors are:
1. Whether the fixed rent is substantial and a smaller part of the to-
tal rent than the percentage rent;
2. Whether the parties were sophisticated and actively negotiated
the lease;
3. Whether the landlord included an express covenant of conti-
nuous operation in leases with third-parties;
4. Whether the lease gives the tenant broad assignment or sublease
rights; and
5. Whether the lease has language detailing the scope of the te-
nant's business operation or the identity of the operator.
Under the Minnesota Test, the first factor weighs against imply-
ing a covenant of continuous operation if the rent includes substantial
fixed rent and the percentage rent is a relatively small part of the total
471. See id.
472. See id.
473. See supra Part IV.Q (Minnesota); Part IV.M (Kentucky); Part IV.G (Geor-
gia).
474. See Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994).
475. Id.
20091
UALR LAW REVIEW
rent. 6 The second factor weighs against implying the covenant if the
parties were sophisticated and actively negotiated the lease. 77 The
third factor weighs against implying the covenant if the landlord in-
cluded express covenants of continuous operation in leases with third
parties.17" The fourth factor weighs against implying the covenant if the
lease gives the tenant broad assignment or sublease rights. 9 Finally,
the fifth factor weighs against implying the covenant if the lease does
not have language detailing the scope of the business operation or the
identity of the operator.480
Although not exactly followed in any other state, the Minnesota
Test is heavily influenced by Michigan. 81 The Michigan court analyzes
whether the base rent provided a substantial return on the landlord's
investment;482 whether the parties "deliberately and extensively" nego-
tiated the lease;483 and whether there are express continuous operating
clauses in other leases executed between the landlord and third-
parties. ' 4 Also, though not included in the factor test, neither Michi-
gan nor Minnesota finds the presence of a noncompetitive restriction
on the landlord relevant.
Although the Minnesota Test covers more factors than the Geor-
gia Test, the question is whether the Minnesota Test covers enough
issues to be sufficiently comprehensive. Like the Georgia Test, the
Minnesota Test seems to overlook issues important in other states
such as whether there is economic interdependence of the parties or
whether the tenant has rights to remove fixtures.
4. The West Virginia Test
West Virginia uses a four factor test. The factors are:
1. Whether the lease contains an inconsistent express term or a
provision for a substantial fixed base rent;
476. See id. at 729.
477. See id.
478. See id. at 729-30.
479. See id. at 730.
480. See Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 730.
481. See Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
482. See id. at 609.
483. See id. at 610.
484. See id.
485. See Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 730; Schuberg, 317 N.W.2d at 610.
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2. Whether the lease contains a provision giving the tenant free as-
signability of the lease;
3. Whether the lease was actively negotiated by all parties involved;
and
4. Whether the lease contains a noncompetitive provision.4
As noted in the general analysis of West Virginia's law, the first
factor would be better expressed as two separate factors. West Virgin-
ia's analysis examines the lease for inconsistent factors, and then looks
for provisions regarding how substantial the fixed rent is.4 This factor
(or factors) weighs against implying a covenant of continuous opera-
tion if there are inconsistent terms, or if the fixed rent is substantial.4
The second factor weighs against finding a covenant of conti-
nuous operation if the lease contains a provision giving the tenant free
assignability of the lease.4 The third factor weighs against implying
the covenant if the lease was actively negotiated by all parties in-
volved.490 The fourth factor weighs against finding the implied cove-
nant if the lease does not contain a noncompetitive provision.91
Like the Minnesota Test, the West Virginia Test is well-
developed and considers a variety of factors deemed important in
many states. Like Minnesota and Georgia, however, the West Virginia
Test ignores some possibly important factors. For instance, the test
does not consider the economic interdependence of the parties. The
test also does not consider whether the tenant can remove the fixtures
or whether an "any lawful use" clause is fatal to implying the cove-
nant.
5. Other Factors
As noted, most states do not use an established factor test. There
seem to be common themes, however, that states look for, though
there is significant disagreement on how to interpret some factors.
This section will briefly examine the frequently recurring factors and
discuss how states approach the issue.
486. Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1991).
487. See Frederick Bus. Props. Co. v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 176,
181-82 (W. Va. 1994).
488. See id.
489. See Thompson, 413 S.E.2d at 141.
490. See id. at 141-42.
491. See id. at 142.
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a. Whether there is sufficient fixed rent to compensate the
landlord
Many states examine the adequacy or sufficiency of the fixed
rent. This is a somewhat different concept than the question of wheth-
er the fixed rent is significant in relation to the base rent. When ex-
amining the adequacy of the fixed rent, the question is typically
whether the rent is sufficient to compensate the landlord for its in-
vestment in the property." If the fixed rent is sufficient to compensate
the landlord, then this factor weighs against implying a covenant of
continuous operation.493 Numerous states apply this factor including
Connecticut, '4  Kansas, '95 Kentucky,49 Massachusetts, 97 Michigan,498
North Carolina, 9 Oklahoma"° and Tennessee."'
b. Whether the Fixed Rent Is Significant Compared to
Percentage Rent
Some states look at the significance of the fixed rent compared to
the percentage rent. The question is usually whether the lease relies
heavily on percentage rent or has better than nominal fixed rent. If the
lease has only nominal fixed rent, so that the landlord only profits
from the percentage rent, then courts are more likely to imply a cove-
nant of continuous operation. This approach is followed in Alabama,"'
Arizona,0 3 California," Connecticut, °5 Georgia, Idaho,5° Iowa50'
492. See Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 226 S.E.2d 232, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976);
Jenkins v. Rose's 5, 10 and 25 cent Stores, 197 S.E. 174, 175 (N.C. 1938). See also Stop
& Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 200 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Mass. 1964).
493. See id.
494. See Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brundle, 698 A2d 920, 924f (Con. App. Ct.
1997).
495. See Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 198 P.2d 541, 551 (Kan. 1967).
496. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SuperRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
497. See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Granem, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (Mass. 1964).
498. See Carl A. Schuberg v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982).
499. See Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 226 S.E.2d 232,234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
500. See Okla. Plaza Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 F.3d 1179, 1180 (10th
Cir. 1998) and BVT Lebanon Shopping Center, Ltd., 1999 WL 236273 at *7
501. See Hamilton W. Dev., Ltd. v. Hills Stores Co., 959 F. Supp. 434, 440-41 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
502. See Percoff v. Solomon, 67 So.2d 31,39 (Ala. 1953).
503. See First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, 940
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
504. See Brentwood Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-16387, 2000 WL
734384, at *1 (9th Cir. June 7, 2000). See also Brentwood Investors v. Wal-Mart
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Kansas,' 0 Minnesota,"1  Missouri,'" Ohio, Rhode Island,"' Tennes-
see,"4 Texas,"'Washington,"6 and West Virginia."'
c. Whether the tenant has an unfettered right of assign-
ment or subletting
Many states examine whether the tenant has an unfettered right
to assign or sublease the property to a third party. There is, however,
division among the states on how to interpret this factor. Some states
take the position that the tenant's right to assign or sublease the prop-
erty is inconsistent with implying a covenant of continuous operation.
Other states believe the tenant's right to sublease the property is irre-
levant, or at least not fatal to the implied covenant.
The majority position is that having an assignment right weighs
against implying a covenant of continuous operation. Georgia's hold-
ing is fairly representative of the majority approach, which provides:
"[an] agreement's provision for free assignability by the tenant, with-
out consent of the lessor, weighs strongly against a construction of the
contract which would require the tenant to continue its business
throughout the term of the lease.""' 8 This concept is repeated in Ida-
ho," 9 Illinois,2 Indiana, 2' Kansas,' Minnesota, 23 North Carolina,"
Oklahoma,'2' Utah,'26 and West Virginia."'
Stores, Inc., No. C-95-0856, 1998 WL 337968, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 1998).
505. See Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 924 (Conn. App. Ct.
1997).
506. See DPLM, Ltd. v. J.H. Harvey Co., 526 S.E.2d 409,415 (1999).
507. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
508. See E. Broadway Corp. v. Taco Bell Corp., 542 N.W.2d 816,820 (Iowa 1996).
509. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
510. See Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
511. See EMRO Mktg. Co. v. Plemmons, 855 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1988).
512. See Kretch v. Stark, 193 N.E.2d 307,315-16 (Ohio Misc. 1962).
513. See Aneluca Assocs. v. Lombardi, 620 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I. 1993).
514. See BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-
9710-CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (rev'd on
other grounds by BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48
S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2001)).
515. See Nalle v. Taco Bell Corp., 914 S.W.2d 685,688 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)).
516. See Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 617 P.2d 704, 711 (Wash. 1980).
517. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1991).
518. Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478, 479-80 (Ga. 1991).
519. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
520. See Stein v. Spainhour, 521 N.E.2d 641,643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
521. See Keystone Square Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 459
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Arizona, and the states that follow its approach, believes that the
right to assign or sublease is irrelevant, or at least not fatal, to finding
an implied covenant of continuous operation: "The presence of a right
to assign or sublet is not necessarily inconsistent with an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation. The two covenants can be harmonized
to permit subletting or assignment to a business of the same charac-
ter."5" This same approach is followed by Tennessee,529 and Ken-
tucky.530
Iowa takes an approach between the two positions. Iowa holds
that a general right of assignment will negate finding an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation, but a restricted right of assignment or
subletting that requires the landlord's consent will not prohibit the
implied covenant. 3'
d. Whether the lease contains a restriction on the tenant's
permitted uses of the leased property
Another common factor examined by courts is whether the lease
contains a restriction on the tenant's permitted uses of the leased
property. This is another factor that does not have consensus among
the states. Some states believe that a use-restriction on the tenant
implies that the parties intended that the tenant continuously operate
during the term of the lease. Other states believe that a use-restriction
has no bearing on whether to imply a covenant of continuous opera-
tion.
N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. App. 1984)).
522. See Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 424 P.2d 541, 549 (Kan. 1967).
523. See Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
524. See Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 226 S.E.2d 232,234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
525. See Okla. Plaza Investors v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir.
1998).
526. See Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1234-35 (Utah
2004).
527. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1991).
528. See First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 729 P.2d 938, 941
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting with approval the finding of the trial court).
529. See BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-
9710-CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (rev'd on other
grounds by BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 132
(Tenn. 2001))..
530. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,406 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
531. See E. Broadway Corp. v. Taco Bell Corp., 542 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1996).
490 [Vol. 31
IMPLIED COVENANTS
The majority position is that a narrow use-restriction will weigh in
favor of implying a covenant of continuous operation. Utah's holding
summarizes this position. According to Utah, if the "use of premises"
clause is broad, then it indicates that the parties did not contemplate
requiring the tenant to remain continuously open. 3' Conversely, if the
use of premises is very limited, then it indicates that the parties in-
tended for the tenant to remain continuously open. This approach is
generally the same in Georgia,533 Illinois,5 34 New Jersey, 5 New York,
North Carolina,37 Oklahoma,538 and Pennsylvania.39
Some states find the presence of a tenant use-restriction irrele-
vant. The District of Columbia holds that, "[t]he law does not say that
by accepting the grant of premises for a particular purpose, with a
prohibition against its use for any other purpose, a lessee becomes
affirmatively obligated to use it continually for such purpose."40 Simi-
larly, Missouri holds that the mere presence of a term restricting the
tenant's use of the premises does not give rise to an implied covenant
of continuous operation.41 This view is also held by TexasM' and Wis-
consin.543
e. Whether the lease contains an "any lawful use" clause
Although similar to the previous factor, which examined the
permitted use of the leased property, some states give special signific-
ance to the inclusion of an "any lawful use" clause. An "any lawful
use" clause is a provision in a lease that allows the tenant to use the
premises for any lawful use. A typical clause in a lease might read:
532. See Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1234 (Utah 2004).
533. See DPLM, Ltd. v. J.H. Harvey Co., 526 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1999).
534. See Stein v. Spainhour, 521 N.E.2d 641,643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
535. See Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Mkts., Inc., 260 A.2d 841, 844 (N.J. 1970).
536. See Rowe v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 70 (N.Y. 1978).
537. See Forrest Drive Assoc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 576, 584-85
(M.D.N.C. 1999).
538. See United Assocs., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 133 F.3d 1296, 1297 (10th
Cir. 1997).
539. See Slater v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 546 A.2d 676, 678-79 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
540. Cong. Amusement Corp. v. Weltman, 55 A.2d 95, 96 (D.C. 1947).
541. See Giessow Rests., Inc. v. Richmond Rests., Inc., 232 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2007).
542. See Daniel G. Kamin Kilgore Enters. v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 81 Fed.
Appx. 827, 830-31 (5th Cir. 2003).
543. See Sampson Invs. by Sampson v. Jondex Corp., 499 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Wis.
1993).
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"[t]enant shall use the leased premises for the operation of a grocery
store, or any other lawful use." In states that examine this factor, it can
lead automatically to a court finding no implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation. The idea is that any lawful use includes no use at all
(or use as an empty storefront).
Courts that view the inclusion of an "any lawful use" clause as au-
tomatically meaning that there is no implied covenant of continuous
operation are those in Georgia,5'4 Illinois,"5 and North Carolina.' In
Oklahoma 47 and West Virginia,-" an "any lawful use" clause weighs
against finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.
f. Whether the lease contains a merger clause
Some states consider whether the lease contains a merger clause
(i.e., a clause that expressly states that the lease contains the entire
agreement between the parties). If the lease contains a merger clause,
courts will generally interpret this factor as weighing against finding an
implied covenant of continuous operation. A merger clause weighs
heavily against finding the covenant in Iowa, 49 Missouri,55 Oklaho-
ma,55"' Washington552 and West Virginia."5 Idaho and Kentucky will
also consider this factor but are willing to overlook the clause if it is
not specific enough." Kentucky would probably require the merger
clause to specifically disclaim implied covenants of any sort. Kentucky
544. See Piggly Wiggly S., Inc. v. Heard, 405 S.E.2d 478,479 (Ga. 1991).
545. Stein v. Spainhour, 521 N.E.2d 641 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988).
546. See Lowe's of Shelby, Inc. v. Hunt, 226 S.E.2d 232,234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
547. See United Assocs, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 133 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir.
1997).
548. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W. Va. 1991).
549. See Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 28
(Iowa 1978). See also E. Broadway Corp. v. Taco Bell Corp., 542 N.W.2d 816, 819
(Iowa 1996).
550. See Adbar Co., L.C. v. PCAA Mo., LLC, No. 4:06-CV-1689, 2008 WL 68858,
at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2008).
551. See United Associates, Inc., 133 F.3d at 1298 (stating that "as a general rule,
implied covenants are disfavored." Id.).
552. See Fuller Mkt. Basket, Inc. v. Gillingham & Jones, Inc., 539 P.2d 868, 873
(Wa. Ct. App. 1975).
553. See Frederick Bus. Props. Co. v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 176,
181 (W. Va. 1994).
554. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Idaho Ct. App.
1982) (superceded on other grounds by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120, as recog-
nized in Herrick v. Leuzinger, 900 P.2d 201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)); Lagrew v. Hooks-
SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
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might even require a specific disclaimer of the implied covenant of
continuous operation.
g. Whether the landlord is subject to a noncompetitive re-
striction
Some commercial leases restrict the landlord from leasing other
space in the vicinity to competitors of the tenant. When this type of
noncompetitive restriction is present, some states interpret it as a fac-
tor weighing in favor of implying a covenant of continuous operation.
There are some states, however, that do not follow this approach.
California,555 Connecticut,556 Idaho,57 Iowa,558 Kentucky," NewJersey,-6° Tennessee '61 and West Virginia5 62 believe that the presence of
a noncompetitive restriction weighs in favor of finding an implied co-
venant of continuous operation. These states believe that the parties
must have intended the tenant to operate its business continuously if
the landlord is restricted from leasing to a similar business. In other
words, if a tenant has the exclusive right to operate a grocery store in a
shopping center, but the grocery store closes, the landlord is prohi-
bited from replacing the tenant with another grocery store in the same
shopping center. Therefore, the parties must have intended that the
tenant stay open.
Georgia,5 63 Michigan,5" Minnesota, and Tennessee 66 do not be-
lieve that a noncompetitive restriction weighs in favor of implying a
covenant of continuous operation. For instance, a Tennessee court
555. See College Block v. AtI. Richfield Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 179, 183 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
556. See Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 925 (Conn. App. Ct.
1997).
557. See Bastian, 643 P.2d at 1082.
558. See E. Broadway Corp. v. Taco Bell Corp., 542 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1996).
559. See Lagrew, 905 F. Supp. at 405.
560. See Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Mkts., Inc., 260 A.2d 841, 844 (N.J. 1970).
561. See BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-
9710-CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (rev'd on other
grounds by BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 132
(Tenn. 2001)).
562. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 142 (W. Va. 1991).
563. See Kroger Co. v. Bonny Corp., 216 S.E.2d 341,343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
564. See Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
565. See Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
566. See Kroger Co. v Chem. Sec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 468,472 (Tenn. 1975).
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said that, "[t]his restriction on competition written into the lease is not
broad enough to give birth to implied covenants of continuous occu-
pancy and operation of a grocery business .. .."'6 In other words,
Tennessee and the like-minded courts do not see a restriction on the
landlord as being significant to imply a covenant of continuous opera-
tion.
h. Whether the tenant has the right to remove the fix-
tures
Several states examine whether the tenant has the right to re-
move fixtures from the leased property during the term of the lease.
The typical rationale is that the lease probably does not contain an
implied covenant of continuous operation if the tenant has the right to
remove fixtures from the leased property during the lease.5 6 In other
words, if the tenant can take its fixtures out of the building, then the
tenant must not have an obligation to keep its business open.
Most states that have addressed this factor agree that the right to
remove fixtures is inconsistent with an implied covenant of continuous
operation. As stated by Florida "[t]he right 'at any time' to remove
'all' fixtures, counters, shelving, show cases, etc., from the leased pre-
mises is entirely inconsistent with the idea that there is an implied
agreement to continue to operate a jewelry business, to which such
items are essential, in the leased premises. 5 69 This result is generally
followed by Connecticut,570 Idaho,57' Oklahoma,72 Rhode Island,573
Tennessee,574 Utah,575 and West Virginia.576
567. Id.
568. See Stemmler v. Moon Jewelry Co., 139 So.2d 150, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
569. Id.
570. See Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 924 (Conn. App. Ct.
1997).
571. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982)
(superceded on other grounds by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120, as recognized in
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 900 P.2d 201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)).
572. See United Associates, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 133 F.3d 1296, 1297 (10th
Cir. 1997).
573. See Aneluca Assocs. v. Lombardi, 620 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I. 1993).
574. See BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-
9710-CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (rev'd on other
grounds by BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 132
(Tenn. 2001)).
575. See Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004).
576. See Frederick Bus. Props. Co. v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 176,
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Kentucky is the odd state when it comes to analyzing this factor.
Under the Kentucky Test, if the landlord is entitled to the fixtures,
then that is strong evidence that the parties intended the tenant to
continuously operate the premises.5" Tenant's right to remove fix-
tures, however, does not prohibit finding an implied covenant of con-
tinuous operation.
Missouri may also have a different approach to this issue. In
EMRO Marketing Co. v Plemmons,579 the federal court interpreting
Missouri law did not believe that the tenant's right to remove fixtures
was persuasive to finding an implied covenant of continuous opera-
tion."8 This, however, may not be the law in Missouri because the
EMRO case was subsequently, heavily criticized and expressly over-
ruled in some respects by the Missouri Court of Appeals. 81
i. Whether the lease is comprehensive
Some states look at the comprehensiveness of the lease agree-
ment. If the lease is a comprehensive and detailed agreement, then it
is less likely that the parties omitted an intended term such as a cove-
nant of continuous operation. Also, if the lease was heavily nego-
tiated, then it is less likely that the parties accidentally omitted a term.
Therefore, a comprehensive, detailed, and thoroughly negotiated lease
agreement weighs against finding an implied covenant. This approach
is followed by Idaho," Indiana,583 Michigan,5" Missouri,585 New York,
5 6
Oklahoma,5" and Texas.""
181-82 (W. Va. 1994).
577. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,407 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
578. See id.
579. 855 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1988).
580. See id. at 530.
581. See Giessow Rests., Inc. v. Richmond Rests., Inc., 232 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2007).
582. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982)
(superceded on other grounds by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120, as recognized in
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 900 P.2d 201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)).
583. See Keystone Square Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 459
N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. App. 1984)).
584. See Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
585. See Giessow Restaurants, Inc., 232 S.W.3d at 580.
586. See Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 62,72 (N.Y. 1978).
587. See Mercury Inv. Co. v F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523,532 (Okla. 1995).
588. See Nalle v Taco Bell Corp., 914 S.W.2d 685,688 (Tex. App. 1996).
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j. Whether the parties were sophisticated
Some courts consider whether the parties to the lease were so-
phisticated. Often, this factor is considered along with the comprehen-
siveness of the lease factor. They are two different concepts, however,
and would best be treated separately since it is possible to have a
comprehensive lease with unsophisticated parties, or vice versa.
States that consider the sophistication of the parties typically hold
that an implied covenant of continuous operation is less likely be-
tween sophisticated parties. Sophisticated parties are less likely to
omit an intended term, such as a covenant of continuous operation.
Sophisticated parties also have the opportunity to hire advisors, such
as attorneys or commercial real estate brokers, who know or should
know about a covenant of continuous operation and can assure that
the issue is addressed expressly. This approach is followed by Indi-
ana,5 89 Minnesota,"9 New York,59' Ohio,592 and West Virginia.93
k. Whether the parties included an express covenant of
continuous operation in unrelated agreements with third
parties
Michigan59 and Minnesota595 examine whether the parties in-
cluded an express covenant of continuous operation in unrelated
agreements with third parties. These states rationalize that the pres-
ence of an express covenant in other leases indicates that the parties
knew how to draft a covenant of continuous operation and include it
when desired. Therefore, if there is an express covenant in third-party
leases, then this factor weighs against finding an implied covenant of
continuous operation. As stated by Minnesota, "[f]ailure of a landlord
to use an express operating covenant where it has included the cove-
nant in the lease of other tenants further weighs against finding an
589. See Keystone Square Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., 459
N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. App. 1984)).
590. See Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
591. See Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 62,72 (N.Y. 1978).
592. See Hamilton W. Dev., Ltd. v. Hills Stores Co., 959 F. Supp. 434, 440-41 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
593. See Thompson Dev., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 413 S.E.2d 137, 142 (W. Va. 1991).
594. See Carl A. Schuberg, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 317 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
595. See Plaza Associates, 524 N.W.2d at 729-30.
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implied operating covenant because it makes clear that the landlord
knew how to employ such a clause.""
1. Whether the landlord made a substantial investment in
the leased property for the tenant
Some states consider whether the landlord made a substantial in-
vestment in the leased property for the tenant. This substantial in-
vestment usually takes the form of the landlord custom-building a
structure or a facility for the tenant or performing major build-out or
renovation work for the tenant. If the landlord expended considerable
funds for the tenant's benefit, then the rationale is that the parties in-
tended for the tenant to remain in business. In other words, why
would a landlord spend considerable money for the benefit of a tenant
who is just going to close shop? Therefore, this factor weighs against
implying a covenant of continuous operation if the landlord expended
considerable funds for the tenant's benefit. This factor is only consi-
dered by Idaho5" and Iowa.598
m. Whether the tenant is an anchor in the shopping center
Some courts consider the role of the tenant in the shopping cen-
ter. If the tenant is the anchor in the shopping center or there is some
other strong economic dependence on the tenant (other than just re-
ceiving rent), then courts are more likely to imply a covenant of conti-
nuous operation. As stated by South Carolina, "[i]f the anchor tenant
were permitted to leave the premises vacant, the landlord's purpose
for signing the lease would be defeated."599 As stated by New Jersey,
the parties did not intend the tenant's building to be "an 'idle store
building." ' 6° This factor is considered by Iowa,6°' Kentucky,' New
Jersey,63 Pennsylvania,6 South Carolina,6 and Texas.6
596. Id.
597. See Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 643 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982)
(superceded on other grounds by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120, as recognized in
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 900 P.2d 201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)).
598. See E. Broadway Corp. v. Taco Bell Corp., 542 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Iowa 1996).
599. Columbia E. Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 262 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
600. Ingannamorte v. Kings Super Mkts., Inc., 260 A.2d 841,844 (N.J. 1970).
601. See Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 29
(Iowa 1978).
602. See Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
603. See Ingannamorte, 260 A.2d at 844.
604. See McKnight-Seibert Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Nat'l Tea Co., 397 A.2d 1214,
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Some states, however, specifically reject this factor. Arizona does
not provide weight to this factor and criticizes New Jersey's analysis of
the economic interdependence theory.6°7 The Arizona court stated
that:
New Jersey seems to stand alone for this proposition [i.e., that eco-
nomic interdependence weighs in favor of finding an implied cove-
nant of continuous operation] .... Also, the fact that a lessor may
have a myriad of reasons why he desires the continued active oper-
ation by the lessee, unrelated to rent, should not relieve the lessor
from the responsibility, if this is important, of specifically express-
ing his desires on the subject, so that the lessee may properly con-
sider such an arrangement in determining the advisability of enter-
ing into the lease. In short, we find the New Jersey court's "inte-
grated" reasoning to be unpersuasive. 6°s
Minnesota also rejects this approach, stating that:
Moreover, we do not find the economic interdependence theory
advanced by [the landlord] compelling because economic interde-
pendence in cases of large tenants in shopping malls inevitably ex-
ists. Parties entering into such leases are well aware of this interde-
pendence and capable of specifically expressing their desires on the
subject so that it can be fully considered by both parties."6 9
n. Whether the lease is lengthy
Several states examine whether the lease is lengthy. The states,
however, each weigh this factor differently. Some states weigh this
factor against implying a covenant of continuous operation, especially
when the lease is a ground lease. In other words, if the lease is for a
large number of years, then it is more likely that the tenant's business
1217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
605. See Columbia E. Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 262 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989).
606. See Lilac Variety, Inc. v. Dallas Tex. Co., 383 S.W. 2d 193, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964).
607. See Walgreen Ariz. Drug Co. v. Plaza Ctr. Corp., 647 P.2d 643, 648 (Ariz. Ct.
App.1982).
608. Id.
609. Plaza Assocs. v. Unified Dev., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
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interests or plans may change during the lease and necessitate a shut-
down. This approach is followed by Rhode Island1 ° and Utah.611
Other states, however, view this factor differently. Connecticut
interprets a long-term lease as meaning that the parties intended the
tenant to remain in business the entire time.62 Kentucky13 and Ten-
nessee 61 4 take the same approach on this issue as Connecticut.
o. Appropriate factors for Arkansas
The question remains, which factors should Arkansas consider
when faced with the question of whether to imply a covenant of conti-
nuous operation? The factors can generally be classified into landlord-
friendly factors and tenant-friendly factors. So the ultimate issue is
whether Arkansas should take a landlord-friendly approach or a te-
nant-friendly approach. Either option presents a fundamental chal-
lenge to established principals in Arkansas.
From one perspective, Arkansas tends to be a very landlord-
friendly state. Arkansas has a series of cases that tend to find in favor
of the landlord.615 This position is further illustrated by looking at Ar-
kansas' version of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
610. See Aneluca Assocs. v. Lombardi, 620 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I. 1993).
611. See Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 1238 (Utah 2004).
612. See Pequot Spring Water Co. v. Brunelle, 698 A.2d 920, 924 (Conn. App. Ct.
1997).
613. Lagrew v. Hooks-SupeRx, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 401,405 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
614. BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 01-A-01-
9710-CV00607, 1999 WL 236273, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999) (rev'd on
other grounds by BVT Lebanon Shopping Ctr., Inc. v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 48
S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2001)).
615. See generally Lacy v. Flake & Kelley Mgmt., Inc., 366 Ark. 365, 370-71, 235
S.W.3d 894, 898 (2006) (holding that a landlord does not owe a duty of ordinary care
to tenants and that tenants are not an invitee of a landlord); Stewart v. McDonald, 330
Ark. 837, 843, 958 S.W.2d 297, 300 (1997) (holding that there is no common-law duty
for landlords to provide a safe workplace for the employees of a tenant); Wheeler v.
Phillips Dev. Corp., 329 Ark. 354, 357, 947 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1997) (holding that a
landlord has no duty to a tenant to remove hazards from common areas); Bartley v.
Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 121, 890 S.W.2d 250, 251 (1994) (refusing to find a duty on the
part of the landlord to provide protection for tenants); Hall v. Rental Mgmt., Inc., 323
Ark. 143, 149-50, 913 S.W.2d 293, 297 (1996) (refusing to find that a landlord had
assumed a duty to protect tenants by providing some security services); Weingar-
ten/Ark., Inc. v. ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc., 306 Ark. 64, 67, 811 S.W.2d 295, 297
(1991) (holding that a landlord can disclaim its obligation to mitigate damages upon a
tenant's default); Nash v. Landmark Storage, LLC, 102 Ark. App. 182, - S.W.3d __
(2008) (holding that a landlord does not owe a duty to protect a tenant from criminal
acts); Denton v. Pennington, 82 Ark. App. 179, 182, 119 S.W.3d 519, 521 (2003) (hold-
ing that a landlord owes no duty to his tenant to repair the premises).
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("URLTA"). In 2007, Arkansas adopted the Arkansas Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, which is Arkansas' version of
URLTA.616 Arkansas, however, deleted the portion of URLTA titled
"Tenant Remedies" and modified the article titled "Landlord Obliga-
617tions" from five sections to one.
From another perspective, Arkansas is traditional in its interpre-
tation of contracts and not inclined to read terms into a contract. Ar-
kansas holds that "[i]t is the duty of the court to construe a contract
according to its unambiguous language without enlarging or extending
its terms., 618 According to the Arkansas court: "[t]he first rule of in-
terpretation is to give the language employed by the parties to a con-
tract the meaning they intended. It is the duty of the court to do this
from the language used where it is plan and unambiguous., 619 Moreo-
ver,
[o]ne of the basic precepts of contract interpretation is that the dif-
ferent clauses of a contract must be read together so that all of the
parts harmonize, and one provision should not be given effect to
the exclusion of another, nor an interpretation be adopted which
neutralizes a provision in if the various provisions can be recon-
ciled."620
So the question again becomes, which approach is right for Ar-
kansas? Is it a landlord-friendly approach like the Kentucky Test or a
tenant-friendly approach like the Minnesota Test? Should Arkansas
adopt one of the established approaches or create a new one by pick-
ing from a variety of factors? Obviously, only the Arkansas Supreme
Court can make this decision, but what are the options?
One of Arkansas' options is to adopt one of the formula ap-
proaches, such as the Kentucky Test, the Georgia Test, the Minnesota
Test, or the West Virginia Test. The Kentucky Test is the obvious
choice if Arkansas decides to take a landlord-friendly approach. The
Minnesota Test or West Virginia Test is probably best if Arkansas
616. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-17-101 et seq. (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
617. See Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007,
ARK. REAL EST. REV., Vol. 1, No.1 (Spring 2008). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-
501 (LEXIS Supp. 2007) (listing the landlord obligations).
618. North v. Philliber, 269 Ark. 403,406, 602 S.W.2d 643,645 (1980).
619. Stoops v. Bank of Brinkley, 146 Ark. 127, 135, 225 S.W. 593,595 (1920). See
also Lee Wilson & Co. v. Fleming, 203 Ark. 417, 156 S.W.2d 893,894 (1941).
620. Byme, Inc. v. Ivy, 367 Ark. 451, 465, 241 S.W.3d 229, 240 (2006) (Imber, J.,
dissenting).
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wants an approach that is more tenant-friendly or a test that is less
likely to imply a covenant of continuous operation.
Arkansas' other option is to create its own factor test. Arkansas
may choose to start with the Standard Factors to determine if it is ap-
propriate to imply any type of covenant. Arkansas could then move
into an analysis of numerous factors specific to covenants of conti-
nuous operation including the following:
1. Whether there is sufficient fixed rent to compensate the lan-
dlord;
2. Whether the fixed rent is significant compared to percentage
rent;
3. Whether the tenant has an unfettered right of assignment or sub-
letting;
4. Whether the lease contains a restriction on the tenant's permit-
ted uses of the leased property;
5. Whether the lease contains an "any lawful use" clause;
6. Whether the lease contains a merger clause;
7. Whether the landlord is subject to a noncompetitive restriction;
8. Whether the tenant has the right to remove the fixtures;
9. Whether the lease is comprehensive;
10. Whether the parties were sophisticated;
11. Whether the parties included an express covenant of conti-
nuous operation in unrelated agreements with third parties;
12. Whether the landlord made a substantial investment in the
leased property for the tenant;
13. Whether the tenant is an anchor in the shopping center; and
14. Whether the lease is lengthy.
All of these factors have merit and are worthy of consideration. A
fourteen factor test, however, is probably too unwieldy to be effective.
Some of the factors are more important than others. The following are
arguably the least probative:
1. The fifth factor: whether the lease contains an "any lawful use"
clause. This factor may be overreaching because many commercial
leases use this type of language almost as boilerplate. If there is a
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thorough analysis of the permitted uses, it may not be necessary to
include this analysis as well.
2. The sixth factor: whether the lease contains a merger clause.
This factor also may be overreaching since a merger clause is
common boilerplate that the parties may not really consider.
3. The eighth factor: whether the tenant has the right to remove the
fixtures. This factor may be a little too complicated to effectively
analyze and may not add much to the analysis that is not already
provided by analyzing the use restrictions on the parties.
4. The ninth factor: whether the lease is comprehensive. This factor
could be skipped because many leases simply use forms and the
comprehensiveness of the form may not be a true reflection of the
parties' intent. Of all the factors on this list, it may be the most
worthy of being included in an analysis.
5. The eleventh factor: whether the parties included an express co-
venant of continuous operation in unrelated agreements with third
parties. This factor could be eliminated because the presence of an
express covenant of continuous operation in a third-party lease
may be the result of many causes, including a different attorney
drafting the agreement. Also, including this factor could make the
discovery process more difficult and invasive than it needs to be by
causing the parties to subpoena each other's third-party leases.
6. The fourteenth factor: whether the lease is lengthy. This factor
could be left out because there is not sufficient consensus among
the states whether the length of the lease should weigh for or
against finding an implied covenant of continuous operation.
If these factors are omitted, it would leave the following list of
factors:
1. Whether there is sufficient fixed rent to compensate the lan-
dlord;
2. Whether the fixed rent is significant compared to percentage
rent;
3. Whether the tenant has an unfettered right of assignment or sub-
letting;
4. Whether the lease contains a restriction on the tenant's permit-
ted uses of the leased property;
5. Whether the landlord is subject to a noncompetitive restriction;
6. Whether the parties were sophisticated;
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7. Whether the landlord made a substantial investment in the
leased property for the tenant; and
8. Whether the tenant is an anchor in the shopping center.
Of course, the Arkansas Supreme Court will ultimately decide
what to consider, but this list of factors would keep Arkansas consis-
tent with the majority of states. This list would also balance economic
considerations and the integrity of contracts.
p. Avoiding the analysis through contractual terms
The implied covenant of continuous operation exists for situa-
tions where the lease does not address the tenant's obligation to con-
tinuously operate. It is, however, best for all parties if the lease ex-
pressly addresses the tenant's obligations rather than leaving it to the
courts to interpret. So what should a lease include if the parties want
to disclaim an obligation to continuously operate? A possible lease
term may read as follows:
No Covenant of Continuous Operation. Nothing in this Lease
shall be interpreted or construed as either an express or implied
covenant of continuous operation or covenant against going dark.
The parties recognize and agree that Tenant, in its sole discretion,
shall have the absolute right to cease operations at the premises at
any time prior to the expiration of the lease so long as Tenant ful-
fills all obligations contained in this Lease, including without limi-
tation paying the fixed rent and maintaining the premises in good
order and repair. Landlord hereby waives any right or claim for
damages or equitable relief related to Tenant ceasing business op-
erations at the leased premises. Tenant's cessation of business shall
not be deemed an abandonment or surrender of the leases premis-
es so long as Tenant continuous to fulfill its obligations under this
Lease. Neither the existence of percentage rent nor Tenant's role
as a so-called "anchor" (as that term is used in the shopping center
industry) in the shopping center shall imply a covenant of conti-
nuous operation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arkansas' law on the implied covenant of continuous operation is
sparse at best. Landlords and tenants in Arkansas have very little
guidance to help them understand the legal rights of the parties if the
lease does not expressly address the tenant's obligation to operate.
Arkansas' only guidance comes from the Patton case.
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The Patton case, however, has many weaknesses. First, the Patton
case is a federal case interpreting Arkansas law and is, therefore,
merely persuasive. Second, the Patton case failed to provide a clear
structure for analyzing implied covenants of continuous operation.
The Patton case cites the Kentucky Test for the implied covenant. The
Kentucky Test, however, is very landlord-friendly, has been criticized
by other states, and takes an approach that is followed by only two
other states. Furthermore, even though the court described the Ken-
tucky Test, the court failed to fully analyze the factors or follow the
spirit of the test based on its application in Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Connecticut. Instead, the Patton court drifted between several differ-
ent factors to conclude the lease in the case at bar did not contain a
covenant of continuous operation. The result is that the Patton case
provides little guidance and, perhaps, more confusion.
Arkansas would be well-advised to distinguish the Patton case
and avoid applying its rationale in future cases. The Patton case is not,
however, all bad and probably ultimately reaches a result that Arkan-
sas would concur with. Even though Arkansas tends to be very lan-
dlord-friendly, Arkansas is also reluctant to burden parties in a con-
tract with obligations that are not expressly stated. Although the Ken-
tucky Test is likely to imply a covenant of continuous operation, the
Kentucky Test stands as a minority position. The majority of states
apply an analysis that is reluctant to find an implied covenant of conti-
nuous operation. Arkansas should follow the majority approach and
adopt a test that would not imply a covenant of continuous operation
except in special and unique circumstances.
Instead of relying on the courts, parties are better off if they di-
rectly address the tenant's obligations and expressly state whether the
tenant has an obligation to continuously operate during the lease.
Without expressing the obligation, the parties are left to the discretion
of the court and both may be left with a result they did not desire. If
the landlord is counting on the tenant to continuously operate, either
to collect percentage rent or to anchor a shopping center, then the
landlord should expressly state the tenant's obligation. Likewise, if the
tenant is counting on the flexibility to close its operations during the
term of the lease, then the tenant should expressly state that it has the
right to close.
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